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Abstract
This study aims at the development and evaluation of elements for inclusion in an
intellectual property rights system sui generis for the protection of plant varieties.  Pursuant
to the TRIPS Agreement, members shall provide patent protection for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology.  Members are allowed to
exclude from patentability inter alia plants and animals other than microorganisms.
However, the TRIPS Agreement explicitly requires members to provide for the protection
of plant varieties either "by patents or by an effective sui generis  system or by any combination
thereof."
The report studies the legal obligations posed by the TRIPS agreement in relation to
plant genetic resources.  It further analyzes the status of plant genetic resources
under the existing international regulatory framework, in particular the Convention
on Biological Diversity.  The study gives an overview of and discusses possible
elements, for example recognition of Farmers' Rights, which, if included in a
protection system for plant varieties, may contribute to reconciliation of the interests
of formal breeders with the rights and interests of informal breeders.  The study also
examines the options for regulating the interface between a sui generis  legislation
and other intellectual property rights, such as patents.  There is a broad range of
possible TRIPS-compatible sui generis  systems.  Those systems should be explored
and discussed before ready-made protection systems currently being used in many
industrialized countries are adopted.
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Preface
As per the Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), member countries shall provide patent protection for any
invention.  However, according to Article 27 (3) b of the Agreement, member countries are
allowed to exclude from patentability inter alia plants and animals other than
microorganisms as well as essentially biological processes, other than non-biological and
microbiological processes, for the production of plants or animals.  Should countries
choose not to recognize patent protection on plants, they are required to provide for the
protection of plant varieties by an “effective sui generis system”.  The TRIPS Agreement
foresees a review of this provision four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO-
TRIPS Agreement, i.e. in 1999.
In view of the importance of the decision of countries to opt for patents, an effective sui
generis system, or a combination thereof, to protect plant varieties, the International Plant
Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) has commissioned a study of these options with the
aim of also developing elements which might be incorporated within sui generis legislation.
Such a study, it was hoped, would facilitate the establishment of “tailor-made” protection
systems which are well adapted to the national needs and requirements of individual
countries.
The study and production of the subsequent report have been carried out by Dan
Leskien, an academic lawyer based in Hamburg, and Michael Flitner, an economic
geographer currently with the University of Freiburg, Germany.  Throughout the study and
report-writing, wide consultation with experts was carried out.  A first draft was sent to
selected organizations and individuals with the request to provide a written critique and to
point to any factual errors in the report.  While many comments came in, few critiques were
received.  Therefore, it was decided to incorporate all the inputs directly into the report and
these contributions and comments are hereby duly acknowledged and individuals thanked
for their time and efforts.  The financial contribution from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für
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Introduction
The aim of this study is the development and evaluation of elements for inclusion in an
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) system sui generis for plant varieties.  The obligation to
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an "effective sui generis
system or by combination thereof" is enshrined in the World Trade Organization's
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
In the debate over plant genetic resources, the term 'sui generis system' has no uniform
meaning.  It is sometimes used to denote alternative rights regimes for the protection of
community innovations not protectable under conventional intellectual property laws, or to
mean a system embodying farmers' and indigenous peoples' rights. Since this study aims to
explore TRIPS-compatible elements for the protection of plant varieties, we use the term 'sui
generis system' not in this wider sense, but strictly in accordance with its meaning within
the TRIPS Agreement.
Yet, the sui generis system for plant varieties could contain elements serving as a tool or
'trigger' for benefit-sharing mechanisms between providers and users of germplasm and
related knowledge.  Some of these elements which could at least facilitate the sharing of
benefits will be discussed in this study.  However, it seems that the sui generis system is not
the most suitable and most effective instrument for addressing this issue, as the coverage of
any sui generis system in the sense understood in the TRIPS Agreement will inevitably be
less broad than that by access legislation or product authorization laws.  Similarly,
'traditional resource rights' cannot be realized solely by a sui generis system in the sense
understood in the TRIPS Agreement. Property issues relating to biological resources are
only one among many concerns of farming communities and indigenous peoples.
Consequently, the establishment of a reward system sui generis for plant varieties may
require that complimentary legislation be implemented simultaneously, providing for fair
and equitable benefit-sharing and recognizing traditional resource rights including
Farmers' Rights.
The study consists of five main chapters.  Chapter 1 elaborates on the obligations and
options with regard to the patenting of plant genetic material under the TRIPS Agreement.
Chapter 2 summarizes the minimum requirements a TRIPS-compatible sui generis system
for the protection of plant varieties has to comply with.  Chapter 3 outlines the international
framework on plant genetic resources as it has developed over the last decade.  There are
several international legal texts dealing specifically with biological resources and with the
rights and obligations of their caretakers and users.  Any future legislative intervention in
this area should certainly take account not only of the existing binding agreements but also
of the emerging non-binding principles in international law. Chapter 4 discusses a range of
different possible elements for inclusion in a sui generis right for the protection of plant
varieties.  The elements of existing plant variety protection laws of several countries are
analyzed and several new elements that may be helpful in tailoring national laws to the
specific needs of different countries, in line with the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement,
are proposed.  Chapter 5 summarizes the considerations that should be taken into account
when designing a sui generis system and furnishes an example of one of the many possible
ways to bring the different elements of a sui generis system together.
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1.  Plant Genetic Resources and the TRIPS Agreement
Summary
Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) shall provide patent protection for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided the inventions are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. They are allowed,
however, to exclude from patentability inter alia plants and animals other than microorganisms,
and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes.  Yet members are required to provide for the protection
of plant varieties either by patents or by an "effective sui generis system or by any combination
thereof".
If member states do not opt for this general exclusion, however, plants and parts thereof would
still have to comply with the general requirements of patent law, which may pose serious
impediments to the granting of patents which claim or relate to plants or parts thereof.
Member states remain free to refuse patents for living material which has merely been
discovered or whose use is already known.  It does not follow from the TRIPS Agreement that by
their first isolation or by purification, naturally occurring gene sequences and other parts of plants
must become eligible for patent protection.
The TRIPS Agreement does not oblige member states to recognize the deposit of self-
replicable material as equivalent to the written, sufficiently clear and complete disclosure of an
invention.  This non-recognition of the deposit of plants and parts thereof for patent purposes may
de facto exclude many plant genetic innovations from patentability.
Furthermore, plant genetic innovations may fall under the optional exclusion from patentability
of inventions, the prevention of the commercial exploitation of which within their territory is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality.  This includes protecting human, animal or plant life
or health and avoiding serious prejudice to the environment. While such exclusions must not be
made merely because the exploitation of the invention is prohibited by a member state's law,
approval of the exploitation does not per se suffice to establish compliance of an invention with
ordre public and morality.
The TRIPS Agreement enumerates the patent protection requirements (novelty, non-
obviousness, industrial applicability/usefulness) but does not define them in detail.  In particular,
the requirement of non-obviousness (inventive step) may constitute a serious obstacle for plant
genetic innovations.
Finally, the TRIPS Agreement does not define in detail the scope of protection of patents on
biological material and biotechnological processes.  Although it is not clear from the TRIPS
Agreement whether members providing patent protection for plants would have to ensure that the
protection conferred by such patents also extends to plants which have been produced without
using the invention, but by propagation or multiplication instead, it is certainly not impossible that
a panel would take this view.  In order to be on the "safe side" members which are not interested
in providing any patent protection in relation to plants should therefore exclude plants and
essentially biological processes from patentability.
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On 1 January 1995 the Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
entered into force.  So far 131 countries have accepted the Agreement and a further 29
countries are in the process of negotiating their accession to it. Membership of the WTO is
thus almost universal.
Pursuant to the WTO Agreement's Annex 1C, which is the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), members shall provide patent protection for
any invention, whether product or process, in all fields of technology, provided the
invention is new, involves an inventive step, is capable of industrial application, and is
disclosed in a manner sufficiently clear and complete to be carried out by a person skilled
in the art.1  Member states are allowed, however, to exclude from patentability inter alia
plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.
However, members are required to provide for the protection of plant varieties either by
patents or by an "effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof".
In relation to plants there are at least four alternative approaches (see Table 1) from
among which WTO member states may choose:
• They may exclude plants (including plant varieties) from patentability.
Consequently they would have to establish a sui generis system for the protection
of plant varieties.  Technically such a sui generis system could form part of other
IPR laws such as the patent law. Alternatively it could be included in a separate
law.
• Member states may also choose not to exclude plants (including plant varieties)
from patentability and, consequently, apply the normal patent requirements to
plant varieties.  In this case they would not have to set up a sui generis system for
the protection of plant varieties.
• Member states could also decide not to exclude plants from patentability and to
provide for the protection of plants/plant varieties by two forms of protection, a
sui generis system and patent law.  This approach would reflect the legal
situation as it exists in principle in the United States.
• Finally, member states could choose to exclude only plant varieties  from
patentability.  In this case the question would arise as to whether 'plant
varieties' as such would then  be patentable.  In any case member states choosing
this alternative, which is reflected in the European Patent Convention (EPC),
would have to provide for the protection of plant varieties by a sui generis
system. (The reverse option – exclusion of plants other than plant varieties – is a
non-option since a plant variety is always physically represented by plants
while, vice versa, not all plants necessarily belong to a variety.)
While this study focuses on the development of a sui generis system for the protection of
plant varieties, the alternatives have not been ignored.  First, because even if plants are
excluded from patentability there may be overlaps between a sui generis system and patent
legislation, which need careful consideration.  Second, the option not to exclude
                                                                
1  The terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial application" may be deemed by a Member
to be synonymous with the terms "non-obvious" and "useful" respectively; cf. Article 27 (1) TRIPS
Agreement.
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Table 1.  Article 27 (3) b TRIPS Agreement and the options relating to plants
  No exclusion of
plants
 Exclusion of plant
varieties only
 Exclusion of plants
(including plant varieties)
 Patentability of: • plants (including
plant varieties)
• plants other than
plant varieties
 
    






• required • required
 
 
 plants (including plant varieties) from patentability needs to be considered since it could
turn out to be an easier and more cost-effective way to follow the obligations posed by the
TRIPS Agreement without prejudicing the actual granting of patents for plants.
 Thus, after considering briefly the time frame for implementing the TRIPS Agreement
(1.1) and the principles which are relevant for its interpretation (1.2) this chapter discusses
the patentability of plant genetic materials in case plants are not excluded from
patentability (1.3).  The subsequent sections discuss the option to exclude inventions from
patentability on grounds of ordre public, morality and protection of the environment (1.4)
and the option to exclude plants (1.5) and essentially biological processes from
patentability (1.6).  Subsequently the rights conferred by patents on biological material (1.7)
as well as the scope of such patents (1.8) are discussed. Finally possible exceptions to the




 1.1  The time frame for implementing the TRIPS Agreement
 
 1.1.1  Developed and developing countries
 The Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation came into effect on 1 January
1995.  Member states are obliged to apply all the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement from
1 January 1996 (Art. 65 (1) TRIPS).  Developing country members and, under certain
conditions, also members in the process of transformation from a centrally planned to a
market, free-enterprise economy may delay the date of application of the TRIPS Agreement
to 1 January 2000 (Art. 65 (2) and (3) TRIPS).
 A further transition period is available for developing countries.  Developing countries
which are obliged under the TRIPS Agreement to extend product patent protection to areas
of technology which have not been protectable before 1 January 2000, may delay the
granting of such product patents for a further period of five years.  This transition period is
likely to be of relevance primarily for pharmaceuticals and chemicals as well as
microorganisms.  However, only if these products have not been patentable before 1
January 1995, may a developing country make use of this transition period (Art. 65 (4)
TRIPS).  Given that the TRIPS Agreement does not oblige member states to extend product
patent protection to plants, the second transition period is not relevant for plants. And
since Art. 65 (4) TRIPS is applicable to patents only, neither is this second transition period
available for the sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties, even if a sui generis
system would provide for patent-like protection.
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 1.1.2  Least-developed countries
 Least-developed countries are not required to apply the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement
before 1 January 2005.  However, insofar as they provide for intellectual property
protection, least-developed countries have to treat nationals of other WTO members no less
favourably than their own nationals.  They also have to accord any advantage, privilege or
immunity granted to the nationals of any other country to the nationals of all other WTO
members (Art. 66 (1) TRIPS).
 Upon a duly grounded request by a least-developed country, the ten-year transition
period may be extended.
 
 1.1.3  Exclusive marketing rights
 Irrespective of whether a member is a developed or least-developed country, the TRIPS
Agreement requires members which do not make available, as of 1 January 1995, patent
protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, to provide some means
by which patent applications concerning such products can be filed.  The rationale behind
this obligation is two-fold.  Firstly, it ensures that as soon as pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical products finally become patentable (by 2005 at the latest in
developing countries) countries will have to grant product patents not only for new
applications, but also for all those submitted since the beginning of 1995.
 Secondly, and more importantly, least-developed as well as developing country
members that avail themselves of the full ten-year transition period for product patents are
required to grant exclusive marketing rights for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
products.  These exclusive marketing rights shall be granted for a period of five years after
obtaining marketing approval in that country, or until a product patent is granted or
rejected, whichever period is shorter.  Exclusive marketing rights must be granted if a
patent application has been filed after 1994 and a patent for that product, as well as
marketing approval, has been granted in another member state.  Thus, to be eligible for an
exclusive marketing right, an applicant will have to:
• file a patent application in the developing or least-developed country,
• file an application and obtain a patent for the same product in another WTO
member state, and
• obtain marketing approval in that WTO member and in the developing/least-
developed country.
 In practice, the differences between exclusive marketing rights and product patents
might well be of minor relevance.  It has been argued that the obligation to grant such rights
from 1995 onward has made the transition period for developing countries an empty
promise (Dubey 1996).
 
 1.1.4  Review of Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS
 It is important to bear in mind that, in 1999, just one year before developing countries will
have to implement the TRIPS Agreement into their respective national laws, Article 27 (3) b
– the provision of the Agreement which requires the protection of plant varieties – is to be
reviewed.  The outcome of this review is certainly not predictable.  Whatever the outcome,
however, the elaboration of possible elements of a rights regime 'sui generis' for plant
varieties is not premature.  If this provision passes the review in 1999 unchanged, it leaves
less than a year for the development and thorough discussion of a 'sui generis system'.
Moreover, several states are already in the process of developing plant variety legislation,
without any international obligation to do so.  Thus, no matter whether the requirement to
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provide for the protection of plant varieties will be strengthened, weakened or completely
abandoned in the 1999 review, considerations related to the legal status of plant genetic
resources and related knowledge will continue to be of great importance.
 
 
 1.2  Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement
 As will be shown, the TRIPS Agreement leaves unanswered quite a number of questions
that may arise when it comes to the protection, in particular the patenting, of plant genetic
material.  Although the legal competence to interpret the TRIPS Agreement lies with the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (Art. 64 (1) TRIPS Agreement), for the purposes of this study
some interpretation of those provisions crucial for assessing the scope of obligations under
TRIPS is unavoidable.  The basic rules on interpreting the TRIPS Agreement are therefore
summarized here.
 There are three main schools of thought on the subject of treaty interpretation in
international law.  The first, textual, approach focuses on the ordinary meaning of the
words of the treaty.  The second concentrates on the intention of the parties to the treaty.
Finally, the third approach looks at the treaty's aims and objectives.  The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) takes a cumulative approach giving credit to all
three: according to Art. 31 (1) a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.  Where the interpretation according to Art. 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous
or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, recourse may be
had to supplementary means of interpretation, such as the preparatory work of the treaty
and the circumstances of its conclusion (Art. 32 Vienna Convention).
 
 1.2.1  Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
 Since the rules of interpretation as codified by the Vienna Convention are considered an
expression of customary international law (Bernhardt 1995), they are of paramount
importance in interpreting the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Art. 3 (2) of the WTO
Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute
Settlement Understanding, DSU) explicitly states that "customary rules of interpretation of
public international law" shall be applied to disputes brought under this Understanding.
 However, the Dispute Settlement Understanding also states that "recommendations and
rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements" (Art. 3 (2) DSU).  The purpose of this qualification is
not very clear, given the fact that the dispute settlement system only serves to preserve the
rights and obligations of the member states under the covered agreements and to "clarify
the existing provisions of those agreements".  What is clear, at least, is that panels, or the
Appellate Body on appeal, should not make law.  Some commentators, however, have
interpreted this specific prohibition to add to or diminish the rights and obligations as a
rejection of the rather pragmatic and dynamic approach taken, from their point of view, by
the former GATT panels (Kohona 1994; Stoll 1994).
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 The legal status of plant genetic resources under the TRIPS Agreement may depend in
some cases on technical and scientific aspects.  A panel may, for example, wish to draw a
dividing line between plants which may be excluded from patentability and
microorganisms which member states are not allowed to exclude (Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS).  In
such a case panels have the right to seek information and technical advice from any
individual or body which they deem appropriate (Art. 13 DSU).
 
 1.2.2  TRIPS as minimum standard
 The TRIPS Agreement only sets minimum standards; members may, but shall not be
obliged to, incorporate into their law more extensive protection than that required by the
TRIPS Agreement.  The mere fact that certain innovations have been granted patent
protection in some member states does not imply an obligation for other member states to
do the same if the TRIPS Agreement does not require them to do so.  It should be noted,
however, that as a consequence of the national-treatment principle, members providing
their own nationals with patent protection for certain categories of inventions have to make
this same protection available to the nationals of all other members.
 
 
 1.3  The patentability of plant genetic innovations under Article 27 (1) TRIPS
 This section examines the extent to which and under which conditions WTO member states
have to grant patent protection for inventions whose subject is composed of, uses or is
applied to plant genetic material, if they decide not to make use of Art. 27 (2) and (3). For the
purpose of this examination, plant genetic material is to be understood as any plant
material containing genetic information which is capable of self-reproduction or of being
reproduced in a biological system.  Plant genetic material embraces genetic resources of
actual or potential value, containing functional units of heredity which may be utilized for
practical applications.
 
 1.3.1  Plant genetic innovations as inventions
 Whether plant genetic material may constitute the subject of an invention has been and is
still controversial among the WTO member states (Verma 1994; Pacon 1995; WTO 1995).
The TRIPS Agreement is clearly based on the assumption that there may at least be
inventions relating to plants; otherwise the negotiating parties would not have included
the possibility of excluding plants from patentability.
 The first and basic requirement an innovation has to comply with, for the purposes of
patent law, is that there be an invention.  Neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the Paris
Convention give any definition of what an invention should be.  The EPC does not define
the term 'invention', while US patent law only gives a definition of what may be invented,
i.e. any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any
useful improvement thereof (35 USCS 101).  There is, however, general agreement that, for
the purposes of patent law, innovations need to be practical and technical (European
Commission 1995).
 These requirements, practicality and technicality, should not be confused with the
specific patent requirements (novelty, non-obviousness/inventive step, usefulness/
industrial applicability, sufficient disclosure) that inventions also have to fulfil.  Thus, as a
first step, innovations must be of a practical and technical nature in order to constitute an
invention in the meaning of patent law.  Thereafter, to be eligible for patent protection, these
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inventions have to fulfil the patent requirements of novelty, non-obviousness and
usefulness. And finally, their disclosure has to be sufficiently clear and complete.
 However, this first step concerning the required practical and technical character of
inventions may present serious impediments to the patenting of innovations which are
composed of, use or are applied to plant genetic material.
 
 1.3.1.1  Practicality
 The requirement of practicality essentially means that there must be something more than a
mere discovery of an abstract idea, something more than a natural phenomenon.
 In the field of biotechnology, defining the precise line between unpatentable discoveries
and patentable inventions may lead to specific problems that have yet to be solved. This is
because most products of biotechnology are or are based on genes or cells that have been
taken from nature or isolated from pre-existing living microorganisms, plants, animals or
humans. Secondly, biotechnological innovations make use of or are applied to living
material, which may be described as a natural phenomenon. Although patent applications
concerning such innovations do not claim the invention of life as such, their very cause and
effect are inextricably linked with the self-replicability of biological material.
 
 Naturally occurring substances
 Although the patent laws of some countries use the words 'invention' and 'discovery'
synonymously, it is a universally accepted principle that discoveries in the strict sense of
the word are not patentable (Straus 1987).  The EPC, like the laws of many other countries,
goes so far as to explicitly exclude discoveries from patentability.  The Guidelines for
Examination in the European Patent Office (EPO) highlight the difference between
inventions and mere discoveries by way of example: "If a man finds out a new property of a
known material or article, that is mere discovery and unpatentable.  If, however, a man puts
that property to practical use he has made an invention which may be patentable" (Part C,
chapter IV, 2.3).
 In most industrialized countries, the fact that the subject matter of an innovation is
composed of pre-existing material is no longer considered as an impediment to its
patentability.  However, according to the above Guidelines a substance found in nature is
patentable only if the substance has first to be isolated from its surroundings, can be
properly characterized either by the process by which it is obtained ('product-by-process'),
by its structure or by other parameters, and finally, is 'new' in the sense of having no
previously recognized existence.  Thus, as soon as some human intervention has been
required to isolate a naturally occurring substance, and the inventor has undertaken to
properly characterize it, the 'discovered' substance is held to be a patentable invention.
 As with the EPC, under Section 101a. of the US Patent Law, naturally occurring
substances as such would not be considered a "manufacture" or "composition of matter"
eligible for patent protection.  In Funk Bros. Seed Co. vs. Kale Inoculant Co., a patent for a
mixture of nitrogen-fixing Rhizobium bacteria was denied on the grounds that it was a
discovery of a phenomenon of nature.  The US Supreme Court held that "the qualities of
these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men.  They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none" (333 US 127 [1948]).  The so-called product-of-nature
doctrine was reaffirmed by the landmark case of Diamond vs. Chakrabarty , in which the
Supreme Court emphasized that the genetically modified oil-consuming bacteria in that
case were a "manufacture" rather than an unpatentable product of nature (206 USPQ 193).
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However, since then, as is the case under the EPC, naturally occurring substances, like cells
or genes, have also become patentable under US law if they have been purified or isolated
from pre-existing material.  It is in fact a very thin line that separates invention from
discovery under both US law and the EPC (Correa 1994b).
 Nonetheless, there is reason to assume that even in some member states of the European
Union the discovery objection could still be successfully raised in the case of patent
applications claiming biological material.  This assumption is confirmed by a Proposal for
a European Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions which was
published in the end of 1995 (European Commission 1995).  By explicitly stipulating that
the subject of an invention concerning a biological material should not be considered a
discovery "merely on the grounds that it already formed part of the natural world", the
proposal indicates that there is still a risk that without such additional legislation no
common practice in relation to the patentability of pre-existing biological material would
develop in the European Union (Leskien 1996).
 Although in most industrialized countries there is a clear, though not uniform, trend
towards recognizing isolated or purified products of nature as patentable subject matter if
their existence was previously unknown, the TRIPS Agreement does not oblige WTO
member states to follow this trend.  TRIPS gives no indication that by their first isolation,
naturally occurring gene sequences and other parts of plants have to be regarded as
patentable inventions.  Nor does it include any provisions on where the line between
inventions and discoveries is to be drawn.  Clearly, member states remain free to refuse a
patent for plant genetic material which has merely been discovered or where its use was
already known (Correa 1994b; WTO 1995).  We would argue that they are also free to treat
products of nature whose existence was previously unknown as unpatentable discoveries.
 However, in the case of modified or even artificial gene sequences the argument that
they are products of nature and, consequently, unpatentable discoveries may turn out to be
less successful.  A panel established under the dispute settlement system would probably
seek expert advice on this question.  One would expect that the product-of-nature rejection
would be accepted only in cases where the subject matter claimed actually shows no
significant difference from the substance existing in nature.  If, however, genetic material
has been modified so that it shows effects distinct from the naturally occurring original
material, or the material is used in a manner that does not occur in nature, it is less clear
whether the product-of-nature argument would succeed.
 
 Living matter
 While the distinction between products of nature and patentable inventions is still and
may remain controversial in many industrialized countries, the courts in a number of
countries have taken a clear position on whether living material may be patentable.  The US
Supreme Court declared in its 1980 decision of Diamond vs. Chakrabarty  that "everything
under the sun made by man" was patentable.  In this it followed a tradition founded by the
German Federal Supreme Court which, back in 1969, took the position that there was
nothing in patent law to exclude in principle the repeatable application of the natural
powers of living organisms (BGHZ 52, 74 - Rote Taube) from patentability.  In Propagating
Material/CIBA GEIGY (T 49/83 - OJ EPO 1984, 112) the Technical Board of the European
Patent Office stated that "no general exclusion of inventions in the sphere of animate nature
can be inferred from the EPC".
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 Though not explicitly dealing with the issue of patentability of living material, the
position of the TRIPS Agreement is nonetheless clear.  The mere fact that the subject matter
of a patent application is or makes use of living beings or genetic material must not render
the innovation unpatentable.  If the negotiators of the TRIPS Agreement had intended to
allow the exclusion of innovations on these grounds, they would not have included a
provision which specifically allows the exclusion of certain categories of living organisms
(plants and animals), while explicitly exempting microorganisms from this option.
 
 1.3.1.2  Technicality
 In order to fulfil the technicality requirement, an invention must be of a technical nature. It
must also be such that a person skilled in the art can reproduce it on the basis of the
information provided in the patent application.
 
 Technical nature
 The requirement that inventions must be of a technical nature is also reflected in the TRIPS
Agreement, according to which patents shall be available for any inventions "in all fields of
technology".  In many countries living beings used not to be considered to be of a technical
nature.  However, this has changed over time, as can be seen in the TRIPS Agreement.  Thus
it follows from the explicit prohibition to exclude microorganisms and microbiological
processes from patentability, that it shall not be permissible to exclude from patentability
inventions which are composed of, use or are applied to biological material on the mere
grounds that they are not of a technical nature.  Otherwise the prohibition against




 The requirement of reproducibility2 may be problematic, especially in the case of
biotechnological innovations and genetic material.  It is often difficult to disclose, for
example, a genetically engineered organism in such a way that the written patent
application enables persons skilled in the art to reproduce the modification process so that
the resulting organism is genetically identical to that claimed by the patent.  The same
applies to genetic sequences.  A complete disclosure may be even more difficult if
applicants have to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the
inventor (Art. 29 (1) TRIPS).
 The problem of disclosing inventions which relate to or rely on biological material that
is not publicly available and cannot be described in writing alone led to the development of
the instrument of deposit.  In 1949 the US Patent and Trade Mark Office began
recommending to inventors that patent applications for an invention involving a
microorganism should include the deposit of the pertinent microorganism with a culture
collection. (cf. OTA 1989).  Now in the United States all material that is capable of self-
replication either directly or indirectly may be deposited for patent purposes.  Other
industrialized countries followed the United States in accepting the deposit of
microorganisms to complete the written patent application.  However, even in countries
like Germany, which has been a pioneer in recognizing the patentability of
                                                                
 2  While the requirement of reproducibility is universally applied in patent law, some countries
regard reproducibility as a question of whether the claimed product or process constitutes an
invention; others treat it as a problem of sufficient disclosure (see Chapter 1.3.2 - disclosure).
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biotechnological innovations (Bent et al. 1987), it was not until 1987 that the Federal
Supreme Court overruled former decisions and accepted for the first time the deposit of a
microorganism, a rabies virus, as a sufficient description of a product patent claiming that
microorganism as such (BGH GRUR Int. 1987, 357- Tollwutvirus).  Prior to this the court
had accepted the deposit of samples only for the purpose of describing processes using
microorganisms.
 One of the main reasons for this turnaround was the European Patent Office's
recognition in 1982 of the deposit of microorganisms for patents claiming microorganisms
as such (cf. Rule 28 of the Implementing Rules, Part C, chapter IV, 3.5 and 3.6 of the
Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office).
 It is not yet clear whether the courts in Europe will finally also accept the deposit of
biological material other than microorganisms for the purpose of sufficiently disclosing an
invention.  In a recent case concerning a patent on tetraploid camomile plants, the German
Federal Supreme Court explicitly left unanswered the question of whether the deposit of
plant seeds discloses an invention sufficiently (BGH GRUR 1993, 651 - Tetraploide Kamille).
Even among those countries which in principle recognize the deposit of microorganisms
for patent purposes, there are considerable differences as to when deposit must be made,
the date from which samples of deposited material have to be made available to experts and
the public, and the period of storage (Moufang and Straus 1992).  Bent et al. state that a
review of the varied national practices regarding the deposit of biological material for
patent purposes reveals a "striking lack of agreement over basic principles, even among
countries having any manner of established policy on the subject" (Bent et al. 1987).  These
differences also exist among those countries that are bound by the Budapest Treaty on the
International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent
Procedure, which entered into force on 19 August 1980.
 It has been argued that the TRIPS Agreement includes an implicit obligation for member
states to recognize the deposit of self-replicable material as a way of disclosing such
inventions (Straus 1996).  However, the fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not allow the
exclusion of microorganisms and microbiological processes from patentability does not
mean that member states are under an obligation to accept the deposit of microorganisms or
even other self-replicable materials, for patent purposes. Such an interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement would be compelling only if the deposit of microorganisms were an
absolute precondition for disclosing microorganisms sufficiently.  This, however, is not the
case.  Usually a microorganism deposit is necessary only if the microorganism is not
available to the public and cannot be described in such a way that a person skilled in the
art could carry out the invention.  The German Federal Patent Court, for example, held in
1978 that a microorganism may also be disclosed by a description of the process to prepare
it (BPatG GRUR 1978, 586 - Lactobacillus bavaricus). In such a case the microorganism need
not be deposited.  Even if it is assumed that the depositing of biological material is essential
for a complete disclosure of most innovations in the field of microbiology and
biotechnology, it is certainly not correct to state that the non-recognition of the deposit for
patent purposes would amount to an exclusion of microorganisms and/or microbiological
processes from patentability.  The argument that the TRIPS Agreement includes an implicit
obligation for member states to recognize the deposit of self-replicable microorganisms for
patent purposes is therefore ill-founded.
 This interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement is supported by a further argument.
Although the TRIPS Agreement made extensive references to existing international treaties
in the field of intellectual property, there is no reference to the Budapest Treaty which
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provides an international framework for the mutual recognition of deposits of
microorganism strains. This clearly indicates that the negotiators did not intend the TRIPS
Agreement to address the issue of depositing biological material for patent purposes.
 The fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not include the Budapest Treaty's principle of
recognition of deposits of microorganisms in another country means that the date of
deposit of the microorganism in one country would not have to be recognized by other
states.  This would, however, have serious implications for the right of priority which WTO
member states shall accord to nationals of other member states according to Art. 2 (2) of the
TRIPS Agreement.3  In practice the deposit of a microorganism in one state could lead to a
lack-of-novelty4 rejection in states where the application for the patent is subsequently filed,
if these states are not bound by the Budapest Treaty.  Thus, if member states had intended
to require the recognition of the deposit of biological material for patent purposes, they
would certainly have included the Budapest Treaty's principle of mutual recognition of
deposits.
 
 1.3.2  Plant genetic innovations and the patent requirements
 The TRIPS Agreement does not specify what exactly is to be understood under the
protection requirements of novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability which an
invention has to fulfil in order to be eligible for patent protection.  Even among
industrialized countries there are considerable differences in interpreting these
requirements.  The protection requirements may present serious impediments to the
patenting of plant genetic material. Still, it is perhaps unrealistic to assume that they pose
an insurmountable hurdle for all plant genetic innovations.
 
 1.3.2.1  Novelty
 Under the EPC, 'novelty' refers to a state of the art comprising everything made available
anywhere to the public by means of written or oral description, by use, or in any other way,
before the date of filing the patent application.  Under US patent law an invention is still
novel if it was not published or described in a printed publication more than one year prior
to the date of the application.  In contrast to the EPC, applications which claim a foreign
union priority are still novel as long as they have not been filed in the United States (Straus
1996).
 In relation to inventions that make use of or relate to genetic material, the patent
requirement of novelty may pose specific difficulties.  From the TRIPS Agreement it follows,
however, that inventions relating to biological material must not be considered as lacking
novelty solely on the grounds that they relate to biological material.  On the other hand,
members are certainly free to refuse, on the grounds of lack of novelty, a patent for
biological material that has merely been discovered, or where the particular use of material,
claimed to be new, was already known.
 
                                                                
 3  The right of priority means that patent applicants have the right first to file a patent application in
any member state and thereafter to file a patent application in any other member state within 12
months of said first filing, with the effect that these subsequently filed applications will enjoy the
right of priority, i.e. they will be treated as if they were filed on said first filing date. The right of
priority is of utmost importance if "novelty" is defined as absolute novelty on a global scale, since
without the right of priority the first application would lead to lack of novelty rejections of all
subsequent applications in other states.
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 1.3.2.2  Inventive step/non-obviousness
 Under the EPC an invention must include an inventive step.  An invention is considered to
include an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person
skilled in the art.  Given the enormous speed of technological progress in the field of
biotechnology, the requirement of inventiveness may turn out to be a serious hurdle to the
patenting of many biotechnological innovations.  WTO countries may decide, for example,
that if an isolated gene sequence only expresses proteins that the organism from which it
was isolated is also known to produce, the invention may not be considered to include an
inventive step.  They may also decide that routine methods of genetic cloning may be cited
against claims to DNA sequences for specific proteins (Seide and Smith 1995).
 
 According to US law, patents may only be granted if differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would not have been obvious to someone skilled in the art at the
time when the invention was made.  This non-obviousness requirement under US
law until recently presented a serious impediment to the patenting of
biotechnological processes, which are often state of the art and are only being
applied to new starting materials or for the production of new products.  In In re
Durden (226 USPQ 359) the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit had denied the
patentability of these so-called 'analogous process' claims by arguing that the mere
use of a new and patentable starting material in a known process, or the production
of a new and patentable product by using a known process, did not necessarily
make the process itself new and patentable.  By amendment of Section 103 of the
Patent Statute (35 USC 103) the United States overturned this decision in 1995. In
future a biotechnological process will be deemed non-obvious if it uses or results
from a composition of matter that is itself novel and non-obvious and therefore
patentable.
 
 1.3.2.3  Industrial applicability/usefulness
 While in industrialized countries the concept of industrial applicability/usefulness
denotes 'practical utility', WTO member states may interpret this requirement differently. It
has been suggested, for example, that the concept of usefulness and industrial applicability
be revitalized and applied to the problematic effects of protecting an invention (Winter
1992).
 
 1.3.2.4  Disclosure
 An applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner "sufficiently clear and
complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art" (Art. 29(1) TRIPS).
Members may require applicants to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention
known to the inventor.  The best mode requirement also exists in US patent law (Sec. 112
(1)).  It is often still difficult to disclose, for example, a genetically engineered organism in
such way that the written patent application enables persons skilled in the art to reproduce
the modification process so that the resulting organism is genetically identical.  But as
discussed above (see 1.3.1.2 - Reproducibility) the TRIPS Agreement includes no obligation
to recognize the deposit of biological material for the purpose of disclosing an invention in
a sufficiently clear and complete way.
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 4  For a further discussion of the novelty requirement, see Chapter 1.3.2 - novelty.
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 It has been suggested that, as part of the patent law's disclosure requirement,
regulations should be introduced requiring that all applicants filing for a patent identify
the provider of the genetic material from which a patent or a sui generis right has been
derived.  Insofar as patent applications are directed to plants, such regulations would
certainly comply with the TRIPS Agreement which even allows plants to be excluded in
general from patentability and therefore also allows the granting of patent protection for
plants under more restrictive conditions than the usual patent requirements.  However,
where patent applications are directed to subject matter which must not be excluded from
patentability, it is quite clear that the disclosure of the country of origin of the material used
by a patent applicant must not be made an additional patent requirement.  This is because
Art. 29 TRIPS only requires that the disclosure is sufficiently clear and complete for the
invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.  The country of origin of the
material used might appear to be irrelevant for that purpose.
 
 
 1.4  The option to exclude inventions on grounds of ordre public, morality
and protection of the environment (Article 27 (2) TRIPS)
 This section examines to what extent and under which conditions inventions relating to or
using plant genetic material may fall under one of the exceptions allowable under Art. 27
(2) TRIPS Agreement.
 
 Apart from Art. 27 (2) and (3) TRIPS, the TRIPS Agreement provides for general
exceptions which are applicable to all IPR covered by the Agreement.  These
exceptions focus on the prevention of IPR-related anticompetitive practices.  Article
8 allows measures "necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development".  Such appropriate measures may be needed to
prevent right-holders abusing IPR or resorting to practices which unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.  However,
the measures mentioned in Art. 8 are allowable only if they are consistent with the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement as a whole. Furthermore, Art. 40 of the TRIPS
Agreement allows measures to prevent or control licensing practices, which may in
particular cases constitute an abuse of IPR, having an adverse effect on competition
in the relevant market (e.g. exclusive grant-back conditions, conditions preventing
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing).  Again, such measures have
to be consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
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 1.4.1  The necessity to prevent commercial exploitation
 Article 27 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement allows member states to exclude from patentability
those inventions, the prevention of whose commercial exploitation within the territory of
the member state is 'necessary' in order to protect ordre public or morality (including to
protect human health, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment).  However, such exclusions must not be made merely because the exploitation
is prohibited by the law of the member state.
 By stating that inventions may be excluded from patentability only if the prevention of
their commercial exploitation is 'necessary', the TRIPS Agreement limits the scope of the
application of this provision.  The necessity requirement is also included in some of the
general exceptions of the GATT 1994 (Art. XX (a), (b) and (d)) and has been the subject of
several GATT panel decisions.  Reference was also made to it in the first decision handed
down under the new Dispute Settlement Understanding (United States - Standards for
Reformulated And Conventional Gasoline - WT/DS2/9).  In the Section 337 case, the term
'necessary' has been interpreted in the context of Art. XX (d) by a GATT panel which stated
that "a measure is not 'necessary' if an alternative measure which a state could reasonably
be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is
available" (United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 36S/345). The same
reasoning was adopted by the 1990 Thai Cigarette panel in examining a measure under Art.
XX (b).
 Given the aforementioned interpretation by the GATT Panels, it seems difficult to justify
exclusions on grounds of ordre public or morality.  Some authors even argue that Art. 27 (2)
TRIPS prohibits member states from refusing a patent for an invention whose application,
or at least commercial exploitation, is not prohibited by their national laws (Correa 1994a;
Otten 1996; Straus 1996).  However, this opinion finds no support in the TRIPS Agreement
since Art. 27 (2) TRIPS does not require an actual ban of the commercialization as a
condition for exclusions; only the necessity of such a ban is required.  In order to justify an
exclusion under Art. 27 (2) TRIPS, a member state would therefore have to demonstrate that
it is necessary to prevent – by whatever means – the commercial exploitation of the
invention.  Yet, the member state would not have to prove that under its national laws the
commercialization of the invention was or is actually prohibited.5
 In fact, approval or disapproval of the exploitation by national laws or regulations does
not constitute per se a sufficient criterion for examining whether an invention may be
excluded from patentability on the grounds of Art. 27 (2) TRIPS.  This means that a legal
ban of the exploitation of an invention is neither a condition for excluding it, nor is it
necessarily sufficient for justifying such exclusion.  This is underlined by the qualification
contained in Art. 27 (2) TRIPS, "that such exclusion is not made merely because the
exploitation is prohibited by their laws".  This qualification makes clear that the assessment
of whether or not the commercialization of a particular invention is necessary in order to
protect ordre public or morality does not depend on any national laws. Conversely and by
                                                                
 5  In fact, the inevitable time lag between technological developments and the legal regulation of
their application requires that member states be free to consider the prevention of the
commercial exploitation of an invention as being necessary to protect ordre public or morality,
even where the exploitation of the invention has not (yet) been banned by any law. If inventions
could be excluded from patentability only when their exploitation is banned under the member
state's national law, certain inventions, especially milestone inventions nobody had thought of
before and which, therefore, are unregulated, would pass the morality test, whether their
exploitation ought to be prevented or not.
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the same token, a particular invention may be excluded from patentability although its
commercialization is (still) permitted under a member state's national laws.
 
 1.4.2  Scope of the exceptions
 The possibility of excluding inventions from patentability on grounds of ordre public or
morality met with the approval of the negotiating parties at a relatively early stage of the
negotiations.  The negotiations on Art. 27 (2) concerned the fine tuning of the language and
the conditions to be attached (WTO 1995).  While a few further treaties in the field of IPR,
especially the EPC and the Convention after which it was modelled6, provide for similar
exceptions, these exceptions have only rarely been used in the past and only in extreme
cases.  It seems nonetheless useful to recapitulate those precedents handed down by the
European Patent Office in recent years, especially since the terms "ordre public" and
"morality" have been included in the Chairman's text at the suggestion of the European
Communities (European Communities 1990).
 
 1.4.2.1  Ordre public
 While the term 'public order/law' which was orginally used in the Chairman's text (GATT
1990) is primarily known from general clauses included in those domestic laws by which
public order is to be maintained, the concept of ordre public has a more precise and
narrower meaning, especially in international private law.  This is underlined by the
qualification that under Art. 27 (2) exclusions must not be made merely because the
exploitation is prohibited by a member state's national law, which means that the laws of a
member state do not necessarily form part of ordre public.  Echoing Art. XX (b) of the GATT
1994, Art. 27 (2) TRIPS indicates, however, that at least the protection of life and health of
humans, animals and plants as well as protection of the environment may be regarded as
essential elements of ordre public.
 
 The Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office describe as the
purpose of the exclusion of inventions contrary to ordre public, "to exclude from
protection inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder, or to lead to criminal or
other generally offensive behaviour" (Part C, chapter IV, 3.1).  As an obvious
example of subject matter which should be excluded as being contrary to ordre
public the Guidelines mention the letter-bomb.  In Plant Cells/PLANT GENETIC
SYSTEMS (T 356/93 - OJ EPO 1995, 545) the Technical Board of Appeal of the
European Patent Office interpreted the term ordre public as covering "the protection
of public security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of society".
According to the Board's judgement, the concept of ordre public also encompasses
the protection of the environment.  Accordingly, the Board went on to say,
"inventions the exploitation of which is likely to breach public peace or social order
(for example, through acts of terrorism) or to seriously prejudice the environment
are to be excluded from patentability as being contrary to 'ordre public'".
 
                                                                
 6  Article 2 of the Strasbourg Convention on the Unification of certain Points of Substantive Law on
Patents for Invention (1963) reads: "The contracting States shall not be bound to provide for the
grant of patents in respect of (a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so
contrary merely because it is prohibited by a law or regulation; (...)".
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 In Onco-mouse/HARVARD (T 19/90 - OJ EPO 1990, 476) the Technical Board of
Appeal of the European Patent Office held that whether or not ordre public/morality
were a bar to the patenting of an experimental transgenic mouse depended "mainly
on a careful weighing up of the suffering of the animals and possible risks to the
environment on the one hand, and the invention's usefulness to mankind on the
other".  While the examining division to which the case was referred back finally
granted the patent on the onco-mouse7, the weighing-up as required by the
Technical Board of Appeal led to the rejection of a another patent application
concerning a mouse destined to be used not for cancer research experiments, as in
the Harvard case, but for the testing of cosmetics.
 
 1.4.2.2  Morality
 The concept of morality is even more vague than that of ordre public. While morality as a
legal term is used by several human rights instruments like the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as by the regional patent conventions like the
EPC, it has to date played a negligible role in patent law.
 Recently the European Patent Office had to deal with the question of whether an
invention relating to genetically modified herbicide-resistant plants conformed with the
morality clause.  In Plant Cells/PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS the Technical Board of Appeal
held that the concept of morality is related to the belief that some behaviour is right and
acceptable whereas other behaviour is wrong, this belief being founded on the "totality of
the accepted norms which are deeply rooted in a particular culture".  The concept of
morality might thus find different interpretations in the different cultures.  This is also
reflected in Art. 27 (2) TRIPS which by referring to the member states' territory does not aim
at a uniform and universal substantive definition of 'ordre public' and 'morality'.
 
 1.4.3  Biodiversity-related considerations
 It has been suggested that Art. 27 (2) TRIPS may enable member states to avoid or limit
patent protection on plants to the extent that patents could adversely affect genetic diversity
by accelerating genetic erosion (Crucible Group 1994; Cameron and Makuch 1995).
However, it is inconceivable that such exclusion or limitation should be based upon Art. 27
(2) TRIPS, given the fact that Art. 27 (3) TRIPS explicitly allows the exclusion of plants in
general.  Furthermore, Art. 27 (2) only allows the exclusion of inventions whose
"commercial exploitation" is necessary to be prevented; it does not seem to allow exclusions
where the mere patent itself could have adverse effects.8
                                                                
 7  The case is still pending, since several oppositions to the granted patent have been raised (see
Jaenichen and Schrell 1993).
 8  Some authors argue, however, that the patenting of an invention is always an integral part of its
commercial exploitation (Moufang 1988) and that, consequently, an exclusion should also be
allowable where patenting (and not the use) of the invention is contrary to ordre public or
morality. However, it is questionable whether a panel would accept such an interpretation. And
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 It has further been suggested that WTO member states could, by relying on Art. 27 (2),
refuse patents on inventions which make use of or are composed of genetic material if the
provider of this material is not disclosed or the material has been taken by the patent
applicant without the consent of the country of origin or the local community.  This
proposal raises the question of whether the violation of laws governing access to genetic
resources and/or implementing aspects of the concepts of Farmers' Rights or traditional
resource rights could be invoked under Art. 27 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement.
 However, as far as plants and animals are concerned, such regulations requiring
applicants to identify the provider of the material from which a patent was derived do not
need to be based on Art. 27 (2).  The option to exclude plants and animals from
patentability (Art. 27 (3) TRIPS) embraces the option to grant patents (or sui generis rights)
on plants and animals under more restrictive requirements than the usual patent
requirements.
 The situation is different, however, for patent applications directed to genetic material
which must not be excluded from patentability, such as microorganisms.  For those
inventions the TRIPS Agreement does not allow further protection requirements to be
introduced, since the patent requirements are exhaustively regulated in Art. 27 (1) and 29
TRIPS.  Here the question may actually arise whether the principles of PIC and benefit-
sharing as laid down in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) may be invoked
under Art. 27 (2) TRIPS.  A member state could argue, for example, that it would be against
the totality of the accepted norms deeply rooted in that member state's culture to
commercialize inventions without the disclosure of the country of origin of the material to
which the invention is directed.  However, a panel might be reluctant to accept this sort of
argument since, even if the country of origin is not disclosed for patent purposes, this does
not mean that the invention could not be commercialized in accordance with that member
state's norms.  A patent applicant may wish, for example, to disclose the country of origin
not for patent purposes but as soon as the invention is actually being marketed.
 
 
 1.5  The option to exclude plants (Article 27 (3) b TRIPS)
 Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS allows member states to exclude inter alia "plants and animals other
than microorganisms" from patentability.
 There is general agreement that whereas Art. 53 (b) of the EPC excludes plant and
animal varieties only, the TRIPS Agreement is broader in that it allows member states to
exclude plants and animals in general (Otten 1996; Straus 1996).  It is also clear that under
Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS, member states are free to exclude plant varieties only since the option to
exclude plants implies the option to only exclude the narrower category of plant varieties.9
                                                                
 even if this argument were accepted in principle, it would still be necessary to demonstrate that
there is a direct link between a specific patent and, for example, genetic erosion.
 9  However, the European Patent Office's jurisdiction on the exclusion of plant varieties
demonstrates that as far as genetically modified plants are concerned a distinction between plant
varieties and plants is rather sophistic.  The EPO's original practice was to allow in spite of the
exclusion of plant varieties claims directed to groups of plants larger than plant varieties if the
invention related and was applicable to such larger groups.  It did not matter that those broader
claims clearly embraced within their scope plant varieties (Greenpeace UK vs. Plant Genetic
Systems, IIC 1993, 618).  That practice, however, did not accommodate the well-established
principle that a claim is not allowable if the invention claimed therein is (also) necessarily defining
something which is excluded from patentability.  Accordingly, the EPO's practice changed in 1995
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 The question may arise, however, whether the TRIPS option to exclude plants also
implies an option to exclude parts of plants from patentability.  It may be argued that parts
of plants may be excluded from patentability unless they fall under the category of
microorganisms.  If member states could not exclude parts of plants from patentability,
patent applicants could circumvent the exclusion of plants from patentability by claiming
all cells of a plant instead, which would completely undermine the exclusion of plants.
Moreover, the rationale behind Article 27 (3) b TRIPS seems to back up an interpretation of
‘plants’ as to include parts  of plants.  The option to exclude plants from patentability and
instead to establish a sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties is obviously
based on the consideration that member states should be free to decide whether patents or a
different system of protection should be available in the sphere of plant breeding.  Members
which choose the sui generis option should therefore also be free to provide nothing more
than sui generis protection in the field of plants.
 Others may argue that a general exclusion of ‘parts of plants’ would also encompass
agricultural and pharmaceutical chemical products gained from plants and that it would
therefore contravene Art. 70 (8) TRIPS according to which agricultural and pharmaceutical
chemical products may only be excluded for an interim period and only by certain member
states.  It is questionable, however, whether the obligation to grant patent protection for
agricultural and pharmaceutical chemical products further means that those products
must not be excluded in case they consist of plants or parts thereof. Art. 70 (8) TRIPS was
certainly not intended as an exemption to the optional exclusions foreseen in Art. 27 TRIPS.
 However, even if the right to exclude parts of plants is conceded in principle, member
states may only exclude parts of plants "other than microorganisms".  In some member
states, certain parts of plants, like cells, are generally deemed to be microorganisms and
thus patentable (Correa 1994a).  The EPO Guidelines for Examination interpret the term
‘microorganism’ broadly so as to include plasmids and viruses. Similarly, phages, bacteria,
fungi, yeasts and cell cultures are regarded as microorganisms (Jaenichen 1993). In Plant
Cells/PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS (T 356/93 - OJ EPO 1995, 545) the Technical Board of the
EPO even defined ‘microorganism’ to include “all generally unicellular organisms with
dimensions beneath the limits of vision which can be propagated and manipulated in a
                                                                                                                                                                                 
when the Technical Board of Appeal held in Plant Cells/PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS that a claim
defining genetically modified plants having a distinct, stable genetic characteristic was not
allowable under Art. 53 (b) EPC if the claimed modification itself made the modified or
transformed plant a ‘plant variety’.  ‘Plant variety’ was defined as ‘plant grouping within a single
botanical taxon of the lowest rank which, irrespective of whether it would be eligible for
protection under the UPOV Convention, is characterized by at least one single transmissible
characteristic distinguishing it from other plant groupings and which is sufficiently homogeneous
and stable in its relevant characteristics’.
 After the decision in Plant Cells/PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS which did not conflict with previous
decisions of the Technical Boards (see G 03/95, 1996 EPOR 505) transgenic plants and the seeds
thereof are no longer patentable under the EPC.  Owing to the technologies used and the aims
pursued by modern plant biotechnology, i.e. the production of new plant varieties, transgenic
plants fall under Art. 53 (b) EPC and are, therefore, excluded from patentability (Roberts 1995;
Schrell 1995; Lange 1996; Straus 1996).  Given the EPO's interpretation, an exclusion of plant
varieties amounts de facto to an exclusion of (genetically modified) plants.  In order to avoid
legalistic battles over the defintion of patent exclusions, the approach suggested by the TRIPS
Agreement, either to exclude or not exclude plants from patentability, therefore seems much
more appropriate than the approach taken by the EPC.
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laboratory”.  The Board also held that plant cells as such, since modern technology allows
them to be cultured like bacteria and yeasts, could not be considered to fall under the
definition of a plant.  Given this interpretation members would not be allowed to exclude
from patentability those parts of plants that are unicellular organisms and can be
propagated and manipulated in a laboratory.
 It is not possible to predict which definition of ‘plants’ and ‘microorganisms’ a WTO
panel would finally accept.  It should be noted, however, that the TRIPS Agreement does
not include any explicit obligation to apply as broad an interpretation of microorganisms
as has become common in most industrialized countries.  It should also be noted that with
new technology, whole plants can be regenerated from single plant cells (Lange 1996). In
the light of these technological developments, it seems therefore reasonable to define at least
those plant cells from which plants can be regenerated as included within ‘plants’. It is less
clear whether those parts of plants which cannot be regenerated to whole plants can also
be excluded from patentability under Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS.  But even if a panel interpreted the
term ‘microorganism’ as covering certain parts of plants, plants which then include
patented material would not necessarily have to be affected by such patents (see 1.8).
 
 
 1.6  The option to exclude essentially biological processes
(Article 27 (3) b TRIPS)
 Since under Art. 28 (1) b process patents shall confer to their owners' exclusive rights not
only in relation to the process but also in relation to the products obtained directly by a
patented process, the option to exclude essentially biological processes (Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS)
is of crucial importance.  Whether plants or parts of plants may fall under the category of
products directly obtained by a patented process depends to a large extent on the definition
of "essentially biological processes".  While member states have to grant patent protection
for processes in all fields of technology, they may still exclude from patentability
"essentially biological processes for the production of plants other than non-biological and
microbiological processes".  Straus distinguishes four different processes: microbiological
processes, non-biological processes, essentially biological processes and biological
processes (Straus 1996).  While the first two processes must not be excluded, essentially
biological and biological processes may be excluded from patentability.  One may assume
that the latter category of biological processes was not mentioned in the TRIPS Agreement
since it would not be eligible for patent protection anyway.
 The definition of the three remaining categories poses significant difficulties and may
also lead to controversy among WTO member states. Since Art. 53 (b) of the EPC includes a
similar wording, the decisions handed down by the EPO so far may again be instructive.
 
 1.6.1  Essentially biological processes
 Whether a process for the production of plants is 'essentially biological' depends on which
part of the process one is looking at.  In the field of plant biotechnology, claims usually
relate to multistep processes comprising the modification of plant cells, the subseqeuent
regeneration of plants from those cells, and, finally, the propagation or planting of the
regenerated plants.
 Neither the TRIPS Agreement, nor the EPC define the term "essentially biological
process for the production of plants and animals".  In Plant Cells/PLANT GENETIC
SYSTEMS, the Technical Board of the EPO gave a negative definition of what does not
constitute an essentially biological process, i.e. "a process for the production of plants
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comprising at least one essential technical step, which cannot be carried out without
human intervention and which has a decisive impact on the final result".  Similarly, the
European Commission's Proposal for a directive on the legal protection of biotechnological
inventions (European Commission 1995) defines essentially biological processes as "any
process which, taken as a whole, exists in nature or is not more than a natural ... breeding
process".
 However, there is nothing in the TRIPS Agreement following this line of definitions.  It
would therefore seem to comply with Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS if multistep processes consisting of
the genetic modification of plant cells, the subsequent regeneration of plants and, finally,
the propagation of these plants, are treated as 'essentially biological' and, consequently,
refused patent protection.  It also seems to be allowable under the TRIPS Agreement to treat
processes that include as an essential element a biological step, such as the propagation of
plants, as 'essentially biological'.
 
 1.6.2  Microbiological processes
 Article 27 (3) b TRIPS exempts microbiological processes from the option to exclude
essentially biological processes. This exemption thus restores for microbiological processes
the general principle of patentability laid down in Art. 27 (1) TRIPS. Again, neither the
TRIPS nor the EPC define "microbiological process".
 
 In Plant Cells/PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS the Technical Board of the EPO held that
the concept of 'microbiological processes' refers only to processes in which
microorganisms, or their parts, are used to make or modify products or in which new
microorganisms are developed for specific purposes.  Even more importantly, the
Technical Board explicitly refused to interpret 'microbiological process' to include
any process which is 'essentially microbiological' or includes at least one essential
microbiological step.
 
 The claim underlying the decision was directed at a multistep process which, in
addition to the initial microbiological process of transforming plant cells comprised
the step of regenerating plants from the transformed plant cells and that of
propagating the plant material.  Since under the EPC not only microbiological
processes but also the "products thereof" are patentable, the Board had to decide
whether the multistep process as a whole could be regarded as microbiological
and, consequently, the resulting plants as "products thereof".  In the Board's
judgement the initial microbiological step undeniably had a decisive impact on the
final result because by virtue of this step the plant acquired its characterizing feature
that is transmitted throughout generations.  However, the Board stated that the
subsequent steps of regenerating and reproducing the plants have an important
added value and contribute, although in a different manner, to the final result as
well. In the Board's judgment, these two process steps involve complex phenomena
and events such as cell differentiation, morphogenesis and reproduction and may,
therefore, "not be equated to the much simpler process step of multiplying and
propagating transformed plant cells or tissue in culture, which is a typical
microbiological process".
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 According to the EPO's interpretation, a process consisting of an initial transformation
of a plant cell, and the subsequent regeneration and propagation of plants, would not have
to be treated as a microbiological process as a whole.  Only the initial step of transforming
the plant cell would have to be treated as microbiological.
 
 1.6.3  Non-biological processes
 Lastly, member states must not exclude from patentability 'non-biological processes'. There
are several examples in patent history which may be regarded as non-biological processes
for the production of plants.  There are, for instance, cultivation methods which have been
patentable for many years in most industrialized countries.  Another example is the
chemical treatment of propagating material in order to protect it against pests or chemicals.
Such a process, and even the propagating material that was treated with the chemical, have
been held by the Technical Board of the EPO not to contravene Art. 53 (b) EPC, since "the
innovation claimed here does not lie within the sphere of plant breeding, which is
concerned with the genetic modification of plants" (Propagating Material/CIBA GEIGY).
 
 
 1.7  Rights conferred by a patent
 According to Art. 28 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement a patent shall confer on its owner the
following exclusive rights:
• where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having
the owner's consent from the acts of:  making, using, offering for sale, selling or
importing for these purposes that product;
• where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having
the owner's consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of:  using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product
obtained directly by that process.
 Consequently, members which provide for the protection of plants (including plant
varieties) by patents only and which which do not exclude essentially biological processes
from patentability would have to grant:
• firstly, product protection under Art. 28 (1) a TRIPS for all inventions the subject of
which are plants or parts of plants, and
• secondly, process protection under Art. 28 (1) b TRIPS for inventions the subject of
which are (essentially biological) processes for the production of plants.  In addition
those member states would have to grant the right to prevent third parties from
using, offering for sale, selling or importing for one of these purposes at least the
"product obtained directly" by that process which could include plants and parts of
plants.
 On the other hand, member states which exclude plants and essentially biological
processes from patentability would neither have to grant any exclusive rights in relation to
plants (and, in our opinion, parts of plants) nor would they necessarily have to patent
processes which include as an essential element a biological step (see 1.VI.1).
 However, while plants and – in our opinion – also parts thereof may be excluded from
patentability, they may by virtue of Art. 28 (1) b of the TRIPS Agreement, be classed as
products directly obtained by a patented process.  The question may arise whether the
option to exclude plants from patentability embraces the option to also refuse any
protection for plants that have been directly obtained by a patented process.  The TRIPS
Agreement does not address this question explicitly.  However, it is quite clear that Art. 28
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(1) b TRIPS is not meant to prohibit or limit something which Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS explicitly
allows.  Apart from this, the option to exclude plants from patentability would actually be
an empty promise if member states making use of this option would nonetheless have to




 1.8  Scope of protection and exhaustion of patents
 By virtue of Art. 28 TRIPS patented biological material as such and processes making use of
biological material fall under the exclusive rights conferred on the patent owner.  It is a
completely different question whether these exclusive rights also need to extend to material
which has not been produced by using the patented invention but has been obtained by
multiplication or propagation of patented material or material produced with a patented
process.  The question which needs to be addressed first is:
• Does the protection conferred by a patent on genetic material (e.g. from a
microorganism) have to extend to all material (e.g. plants), in which the product is
incorporated and in which the patented material is contained and expressed?
 Even for member states which exclude plants and essentially biological processes from
patentability this question is not irrelevant given that genetic material must not be excluded
in general from patentability.  The question may therefore arise whether the protection
conferred by a patent on such material would also have to extend to plants in which the
patented material is contained and expressed.  The TRIPS Agreement does not offer a
ready-made answer to this question.  However, in member states that make use of the
option to exclude plants from patentability, one may assume the protection conferred by
patents on genetic material does not need to extend to plants which contain this material.
Otherwise the option to provide for the protection of plant varieties by a sui generis system
only would be severely undermined.
 However, in member states that provide for the protection of plants (including plant
varieties) by patents only and which do not exclude essentially biological processes from
patentability, one may assume that the protection conferred by a patent on genetic material
would also have to extend to those plants in which the patented material is contained and
expressed.  These member states would be confronted by two further questions:
• Does the protection conferred by a patent on a plant have to extend to any
biological material derived from that plant through multiplication or
propagation?
• Does the protection conferred by a patent on a process not only have to extend
to all plants and parts of plants directly obtained through that process, but also
to all material derived from these plants/parts of plants through multiplication
or propagation?
 The TRIPS Agreement is again silent on these very specific though crucial questions and
it is difficult to predict how a panel would decide.  On the one hand it is true that once a
patented product (or a product which has been directly obtained by a patented process) has
been released on the market with the consent of the patent holder, the use of this product no
longer requires the patent holder's consent.  It is said that the patent is 'exhausted'.
However, in the case of biological material the use might often include the propagation or
multiplication of the material which may be seen as an act of 'making' the material, which
is, of course, the patent holder's non-exhaustable and exclusive right.
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 A panel could take the view that only under certain conditions the protection does not
have to extend to plants obtained from the multiplication or propagation of patented plants
(or plants directly obtained by a patented process).  These conditions might include that the
plants have been marketed (nationally or internationally10) with the patent holder's
consent.  A further condition might be that the propagation or multiplication necessarily
results from the application for which the plants are marketed.  Another could be that the
obtained harvest is not subsequently used for further multiplication or propagation.
 One may conclude that, to be certain, member states not interested in providing any
patent protection in relation to plants should exclude plants and essentially biological
processes from patentability.  Although it is not clear from the TRIPS Agreement whether
members providing patent protection for plants would have to ensure that the protection
conferred by such patents also extends to plants which have been produced without using
the invention, but instead by propagation or multiplication, it is certainly not impossible
that a panel would take this view.
 
 
 1.9  Exceptions to rights conferred
 According to Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO member states may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do
not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties.
 It is clear from the drafting history that an act performed for experimental purposes was
intended to be one of the exceptions allowable under Art. 30 (WTO 1995).  The TRIPS
Agreement, however, does not define the scope of the experimental use exception.  While in
most industrialized countries this exception is interpreted in such an extremely narrow
manner, that, as Bruzzone stated, "it is fair to say that a private defendant whose only
defence is the research exemption would do well to settle the case out of court" (Bruzzone
1993), WTO member states are free to choose a broader interpretation.
 
                                                                
 10  According to Art. 6 TRIPS nothing in this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3
(national treatment) and 4 (most-favoured nation treatment) shall be used for the purposes of
dispute settlement to address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights.
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 1.10  Compulsory licensing
 According to Art. 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, members may allow for use of the subject
matter of a patent without the authorization of the right-holder.  It should be noted,
however, that owing to Art. 2 (1) TRIPS, such measures have to be consistent with Art. 5 A
(2) of the Paris Convention according to which compulsory licences may be granted only
"to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights". Even if
compulsory licences are being justified as a measure necessary to protect public health or
nutrition or to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socioeconomic or technological development (Art. 8 TRIPS), they have to comply with Art. 5
A (2) of the Paris Convention, since measures under Art. 8 TRIPS have to be consistent with
the TRIPS Agreement, and therefore with Art. 5 A of the Paris Convention as well.
 Article 31 sets out the further conditions under which compulsory licences may be
granted:  each case shall be considered on its individual merits.  Prior to the granting of a
compulsory licence, negotiations with the holder of the right on the granting of a voluntary
licence shall take place.  The licence shall be limited as to its scope and duration and it
shall be of a non-exclusive nature.  The compulsory licence shall not be transferable and
shall be granted for the supply of the domestic market of the member country only.
Compulsory licences shall be terminated if and when the circumstances which have led to
it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.  The holder of the right shall be compensated
adequately.  The legal validity of compulsory licences as well as any decision relating to the
compensation shall be subject to judicial review.
 Where compulsory licences are granted in order to permit the exploitation of a second,
"dependent" patent which cannot be exploited without infringing the first patent, three
additional criteria apply: (i) the invention claimed in the dependent patent shall involve an
"important technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the
invention claimed in the first patent; (ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a
so-called cross licence, i.e. a licence to use the invention claimed in the dependent patent,
and (iii) , the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable except
with the assignment of the dependent patent.
 Developing countries in particular may in some cases have an interest to grant
compulsory licences where patented products are not locally produced but imported only.
According to Art. 5 A (2) of the Paris Convention compulsory licences may actually be
granted "to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights
conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work".  However, under Art. 5 A (4) of the
Paris Convention a compulsory licence may not be applied for on the ground of failure to
work or insufficient working before the expiration of certain minimum periods and it shall
be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.  It is even more
important that the TRIPS Agreement indicates that import of products may consitute
sufficient exploitation of an invention:  according to Art. 27 (1) "patent rights shall be
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether products are imported or locally produced".  One may, therefore, conclude that
compulsory licensing as it is allowable under the TRIPS Agreement does not seem to be an
adequate instrument for addressing general issues such as the question of the patenting of
plants or parts thereof.
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 2.  The Minimum Requirements of a Sui Generis System




 WTO member states which exclude plant varieties or even plants in general from patentability
have to provide for the protection of plant varieties by an "effective sui generis system".  Although
the TRIPS Agreement does not give any details on what elements this effective sui generis system
would have to include, certain minimum requirements that such a system would have to fulfil may
be drawn from the context of Art. 27 (3) b, the context of the Agreement as an integral part of the
WTO Agreement and, finally, from the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement itself.
 Since the TRIPS Agreement elaborates no further upon the term 'plant variety', member states
have to provide for the protection of plant varieties of all species and botanical genera, by
providing protection either through patents or a sui generis system or a combination thereof.
 The sui generis system has to be an Intellectual Property Right (IPR), i.e. a legally enforceable
right either to exclude others from certain acts in relation to the protected plant variety, or to obtain
a remuneration in respect of at least certain uses of the plant variety by third parties.
 The sui generis system needs to comply with the basic principle of national treatment.  Thus,
member states have to accord to the nationals of other members  treatment no less favourable
than that which they accord to their own nationals with regard to the protection of plant varieties.
 Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a member to the nationals of any
other country has to be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all the other
member states (most-favoured-nation treatment).
 Finally, in order to be effective, a sui generis system requires an enforcement procedure so as
to permit action against any act of infringement of the sui generis right.
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 Member states which do not provide for the protection of plant varieties by patents have to
provide for their protection by an "effective sui generis system" or by a combination of
patents and a sui generis system.  There is general agreement that countries have
considerable room to develop their own systems, even "in a way that may have –
paradoxically – a deharmonizing effect" (Correa 1994a; see also Reichman 1993; Bronckers
1994; Pacon 1995; Singh Nijar 1995; Verma 1995; Straus 1996).
 The TRIPS Agreement goes no further towards defining the words "effective sui generis
system" and there is no drafting history which can be invoked to explain these terms (Otten
1996).  While the main sui generis systems existing at the time of the conclusion of the TRIPS
negotiations were embodied in the various UPOV Acts and reflected in the national laws of
UPOV member states, the TRIPS Agreement does not refer to UPOV.  Thus Art. 27 (3) b
TRIPS neither includes an obligation to become a member of UPOV, nor does it oblige
member states to adopt legislation identical to, or consistent with, any of the UPOV Acts.
 On the other hand, WTO member states that exclude plants from patentability do not
necessarily satisfy the requirement of Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS by having implemented one of the
UPOV Acts.
 It is true, the former Director General of GATT, Peter Sutherland, explained in 1993, that
"while the TRIPS provisions on plant variety protection do not refer to any international
convention, it is clear that, if the standards of protection of UPOV 1978 were to be followed,
it would be reasonable to claim that an effective sui generis protection had been provided"
(The Times of India, New Delhi, 12 March 1993).  However, this statement is misunderstood to
mean that if a country's legislation conforms to the UPOV Act of 1978, it would be unlikely
to be successfully challenged.  Sutherland limited his statement to the "standards of
protection" as foreseen by the UPOV Act of 1978 and did not address the required coverage
or scope of a sui generis system.  Nor did he address the question of whether member states
are required to apply the basic principles of the TRIPS Agreement to the sui generis system.
 In the following sections we argue that although the TRIPS Agreement does not define
what is meant by the term "effective sui generis system", certain minimum requirements such
a system would have to fulfil may nonetheless be drawn from the context of Art. 27 (3) b, the
context of TRIPS as an integral part of the WTO Agreement and, finally, from the objectives
of the TRIPS Agreement itself.  We conclude that the sui generis system has to provide for the
protection of plant varieties of all species and genera (2.1) by an IPR (2.2) to which the
obligations under Art. 3 (national treatment, 2.3) and Art. 4 TRIPS (most-favoured nation
treatment, see 2.4) fully apply.  To be effective, the sui generis system needs to permit effective




 2.1  Plant varieties
 Member states which do not provide for the protection of plant varieties by patents have to
provide for their protection by an "effective sui generis system".
 The statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter by the former Director General of
GATT, Peter Sutherland, is sometimes understood to mean that under the UPOV Act of
197811 member states do not have to provide for the protection of plant varieties of all
                                                                
 11  The 1978 UPOV Act only requires contracting parties to apply the UPOV Convention to a
minimum of five genera when first acceding to the Convention and then within three years
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botanical genera and species under the TRIPS Agreement.  However, as has been stated,
Sutherland limited his statement to the "standards of protection" as foreseen by the UPOV
Act of 1978 and did not address the required coverage or scope of a sui generis system.
Since the TRIPS Agreement neither defines the term 'plant variety' nor specifies any species
or genera the varieties of which have to be protected, it seems clear that member states have
to provide for the protection of plant varieties of all species and botanical genera.  Any
other interpretation of Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS would have to indicate for how many species or
for which type of species member states have to grant sui generis protection and there is no
such provision in the TRIPS Agreement.
 
 
 2.2  Intellectual Property Right
 According to Art. 1 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement the term 'intellectual property' refers for the
purposes of this Agreement "to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of
Sections 1 through 7 of Part II".  These sections deal with copyrights and related rights,
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, layout designs of integrated
circuits, patents and the protection of undisclosed information (trade secret). The
requirement to provide for the protection of plant varieties by patents or by an effective sui
generis system or by any combination thereof is the subject of Section 5 of the TRIPS
Agreement.  It follows that, like patents and all the other rights mentioned in sections 1
through 7, the sui generis system also has to be an IPR.
 It has been suggested that the TRIPS Agreement considers the protection of plant
varieties only casually as an exception to patentability, defining neither the requirements
nor the scope of protection a sui generis system would have to foresee, and that therefore the
sui generis system does not fall under the category of "intellectual property rights" within
the meaning of Art. 1 (2) TRIPS.  However, the purpose of TRIPS as a whole does not seem
to allow such interpretation.  Since the national treatment principle and the principle of
most-favoured nation treatment only have to be applied to IPR (cf. Art. 3 (1) and Art. 4
TRIPS), neither principle would apply, if the sui generis system were not to be considered as
an IPR within the meaning of Art. 1 (2) TRIPS.  This would, however, mean that member
states would be allowed to refuse nationals of other member states any plant variety
protection.  The TRIPS requirement to provide for the protection of plant varieties by
establishing a sui generis system would therefore be of no use to (the nationals of) other
member states.  However, the very purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is without doubt to
make the property rights covered by it available to the nationals of all the member states. It
is inconceivable that the mutual obligation to establish a protection system for plant
varieties should not result in any mutual rights.
 Furthermore, Art. 68 TRIPS indicates that the sui generis system is a form of IPR.
According to Art. 68 TRIPS, the TRIPS Council has to monitor the operation of this
agreement and, in particular, Members' compliance with their obligations under TRIPS.  If
the sui generis system was not an IPR within the meaning of TRIPS, members would not
have to notify their sui generis laws since Art. 63 (2) TRIPS only requires them to notify those
laws and regulations, final judicial decisions and administrative rulings which are of
relevance for IPR.  Thus, if the sui generis system were not a form of IPR the TRIPS Council
would be obliged to monitor the member states' sui generis provisions but would not have
                                                                                                                                                                                 
apply it to at least ten genera or species, within six years to at least eighteen, and within eight
years to at least twenty-four genera or species in all (Art. 4).
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the right to be informed by the member states about these provisions. It should be noted
that, by asking member states to notify their sui generis laws for the protection of plant
varieties under Art. 63 (2) TRIPS, the TRIPS Council itself has actually indicated that it
regards the sui generis system as an IPR.
 Thus, from the wording and context of Art. 27 (3) b and the aim of the TRIPS Agreement
as a whole, it seems obvious that the sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties
has to be an IPR within the meaning of Art. 1 (2) TRIPS.
 
 2.2.1  Intellectual Property Rights covered by the TRIPS Agreement
 The TRIPS Agreement does not define in detail the term "intellectual property right".
'Intellectual property rights' are usually defined as rights granted by a state authority for
certain products of intellectual effort and ingenuity (OECD 1996b).  Most often the term IPR
is used as a collective name for rights such as those dealt with by the TRIPS Agreement.
Most IPR must be applied for to the relevant national authority.  However, neither
copyright nor trade secret protection require any application or formalities.  From an
analysis of the IPR covered by TRIPS one can further draw the conclusion that IPR are
legally enforceable rights either to exclude others from certain acts in relation to the
described subject matter and/or to obtain a remuneration in respect of certain uses of the
described subject matter.
 Most IPR covered by the TRIPS Agreement give a right to exclude others from certain
acts in relation to the protected subject matter.  This right implies, of course, a right to obtain
remuneration where the right-holders allow third parties to perform acts which the right
confers exclusively to the holders.  However, in relation to certain acts covered by an IPR,
the TRIPS Agreement requires no exclusive right to be conferred on the right-holder except
the right to equitable remuneration.  If, for example, a WTO member had a system of
'equitable remuneration' in place on 15 April 1994 in respect of the rental of phonograms,
members do not have to provide producers of phonograms with the right to authorize or
prohibit the commercial rental of their phonograms (Art. 14 (4) TRIPS).
 
 2.2.2  The sui generis system as an additional IPR
 In many cases a product of intellectual effort or ingenuity may be protected by several IPR.
The inventor of a new can-opener may, for example, apply for a patent and at the same time
register a certain name for this opener as a trademark.  The question may therefore arise
whether a member state would fulfil the requirement to provide for the protection of plant
varieties by referring, for example, to the possibility of registering the name of a plant
variety as a trademark.
 The sui generis system certainly needs to confer on the holders an additional right which
WTO members do not have to make available in relation to plant varieties according to
other obligations posed by the TRIPS Agreement.  A WTO member could not satisfy Art. 27
(3) b TRIPS by allowing variety denominations to be registered as trademarks since, under
Art. 15 TRIPS, member states already have to register variety names as trademarks.  If the
negotiators of the TRIPS Agreement had felt that such trademark protection was sufficient,
they would certainly not have included the requirement to establish an additional system
for the protection of plant varieties.  For the same reason, Art. 27 (3) b cannot be satisfied by
giving interested parties the right to prevent others from using misleading or false
geographical indications for their plant varieties.  According to Art. 22 TRIPS, member
states already have to provide the legal means to prevent the false use of geographical
indications, provided that the material originates in a country, region or locality where a
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given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the material is essentially attributable to
its origin.  Finally, and again for the same reason, Art. 27 (3) b requires more than just
ensuring trade secret protection since under Art. 39 (1) TRIPS members are already obliged
to ensure effective protection against unfair competition.
 Thus, the sui generis system has to be an additional IPR conferring on the right-holders a
legally enforceable right either to exclude others from certain acts in relation to the
protected plant variety, or to obtain a remuneration in respect of at least certain uses of the
plant variety.
 
 2.2.3  Sui generis legislation and Farmers' Rights
 It has been suggested that the sui generis system provided for in Art. 27 (3) b TRIPS could be
implemented through the concept of Farmers' Rights.  Given that the sui generis system has
to provide for an IPR, this approach might not conform with the TRIPS Agreement.
 This does not, however, prevent the inclusion of provisions that implement Farmers'
Rights and/or Traditional Resource Rights.  Such an incorporation of Farmers' Rights
based, for example, on the Indian proposals for Community Intellectual Property Rights
and the Plant Variety Recognition and Rights Model Act (Crucible Group 1994;
Swaminathan 1995, 1996), could complement the sui generis system by compensating those
who have been conserving plant genetic resources for the past centuries and thereby have
contributed until now to the development of plant varieties protectable under the sui generis
system foreseen in the TRIPS Agreement.
 
 
 2.3  National treatment
 As an IPR any sui generis system needs to comply with the basic principle of national
treatment.
 The national treatment principle as laid down in the Paris Convention only relates to
specific rights.12  But as defined in Art. 3 (1) TRIPS the principle applies to "all categories of
intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II" of the TRIPS
Agreement and this includes the sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties.
Thus, as an IPR any sui generis system needs to comply with the basic principle of national
treatment.  This means that members have to accord to the nationals of other members
treatment no less favourable than they accord to their own nationals with regard to the
protection of plant varieties.
 A rather astonishing consequence of the applicability of the principle of national
treatment to the sui generis system is, that by implementing the minimum standards of the
UPOV Acts of 1978 and 1991, WTO member states would not fully comply with their
obligation laid down by the TRIPS Agreement. According to the UPOV Acts, UPOV member
states only have to afford the nationals and residents of all the other UPOV member states
and legal persons having their headquarters there the same treatment as their laws provide
for their own nationals.  Under the UPOV Act of 1978 member states may even limit the
right to apply for protection of a variety to nationals or residents of those member states
which also apply that Act to the genus or species to which the variety belongs.  This
                                                                
 12  Art. 1 (2) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property reads: "The protection
of industrial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks,
service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of
unfair competition."
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reciprocity rule, as well as the limitation of national treatment to nationals and residents of
other UPOV member states, would clearly fall foul of the national treatment requirement as
laid down in Art. 3 of the TRIPS Agreement.  With regard to the protection of plant varieties
UPOV member states have to accord treatment no less favourable than they accord to their
own nationals to the nationals of all WTO member states, whether these are UPOV
members or not.
 It is clear that the applicability of the national treatment principle to the sui generis
system makes it far less attractive for WTO members to join UPOV.  Since UPOV members
have to apply their plant variety protection laws in compliance with the TRIPS national
treatment principle, there is no need for WTO member states to join UPOV just because they
want to benefit from the legal protection available for plant varieties in UPOV member
states.  This may be why some UPOV member states argue that the TRIPS national
treatment principle is not applicable to the sui generis system (UPOV 1996).13
 
 
 2.4  Most-favoured-nation treatment
 Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a member to the nationals of any
other country with regard to the protection of plant varieties has to be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other member states.  It should be
noted, however, that in the field of intellectual property the most-favoured-nation principle
is of rather minor practical relevance, since only in exceptional cases would countries be
likely to grant more protection to foreigners than to their own nationals (Pacon 1995).  This
type of discrimination has occasionally arisen when unilateral actions by a particular
country have led to concessions favouring that country's own nationals only (Correa
1994a).
 
                                                                
 13  Although, as mentioned above, this position is barely compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, it
raises the question of whether not to implement any sui generis system would be a political
option. If for their own interest UPOV members themselves do not regard the sui generis system
as an IPR they might not be interested in challenging a country on the grounds of a lack of sui
generis  protection for plant varieties. However, it should be noted that some UPOV members do
regard the sui generis  system as an IPR, as do other WTO members. WTO members should
therefore not rely on those members which currently argue that the sui generis  system is not an
IPR and, consequently, does not have to comply with the national treatment principle. Rather,
they should start to develop and implement a TRIPS-compatible sui generis  system that meets
their needs. The  existence of such a system might be particularly helpful for the review of Art. 27
(3) b TRIPS in 1999 (see 1.1.4).
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 2.5  Effective enforcement
 Article 27 (3) b requires explicitly that the sui generis system be 'effective'.  However, the
TRIPS Agreement does not specify any criteria for effectiveness.  It has been suggested that
effectiveness relates to the level of protection of the sui generis system and therefore requires
certain substantial minimum rights to be conferred by the sui generis right.  Such
interpretation, however, causes enormous difficulties as soon as one attempts to define
those minimum rights.  The UPOV Acts do not qualify as a yardstick since, while there are
many references to relevant international IPR treaties in the TRIPS Agreement, references to
the UPOV Acts are conspicuous by their absence.  Furthermore, and more important, it
might be impossible to define effectiveness on a global scale.  The same protection system
may be of different effectiveness in different countries whatever specific criteria are being
used for evaluating the effectiveness.
 It is, finally, the TRIPS Agreement itself which points at a different interpretation of the
term 'effective'.  The TRIPS Agreement employs the term 'effective' in particular in the
context of the national enforcement of rights and the procedures for the multilateral
prevention and settlement of disputes between governments (cf. Preamble, Art. 41 (1)
TRIPS), while the rights to be conferred by an IPR are either defined in detail or as 'equitable
remuneration' (Art. 14 (4); Art. 70 (4) TRIPS).  Against this background an 'effective' sui
generis system needs to allow effective action against any act of infringement as required by
Arts. 42-49 TRIPS.  Its effectiveness does not, however, depend on its requirements for or on
the level of protection.
 It should be noted that the civil and administrative procedures as required by Arts. 42-
49 TRIPS are based on the presumption, also emphasized in the preamble to the TRIPS
Agreement, that IPR are private rights for the enforcement of which members only have to
provide the judicial procedures.  The right-holders are responsible for uncovering
infringements of their rights and, subsequently, taking the appropriate action in court, if
they so wish.  A sui generis system which provides for a form of distribution of revenues
obtained from a seed tax levied by the government would not seem to fit the concept of the
civil and administrative procedures and remedies as required by the TRIPS Agreement.
Such a system would require the state to control compliance with the sui generis system,
which means the state would have to ensure that consumers actually pay tax when they
buy or plant back seed of a protected variety.  The right-holder, however, would certainly
not be in a position to take action against any act of infringement, i.e. tax evasion, which
would mean that the civil and administrative procedures and remedies as foreseen by the
TRIPS Agreement could not be made use of.  A remuneration system based on a seed tax
system does not therefore seem to comply with the TRIPS Agreement.
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 Apart from the minimum requirements laid down by the TRIPS Agreement, any sui generis system
should also take into account the objectives of other international treaties and/or emerging
principles of the international community, especially those dealing with plant genetic resources
and Traditional Resource Rights (TRR).  Relevant multilateral treaties include the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the ILO Convention 169.  Soft law is contained in a wide range of
instruments, such as the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the International Undertaking on Plant
Genetic Resources (IUPGR), the UNESCO/WIPO Model Provisions for National Laws on the
Protection of Expression of Folklore, and the Draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights (DDIR).
 A set of obligations and widely accepted principles emerges from these instruments that is
certainly relevant in the shaping of a sui generis system:
• States have the sovereign right over their own natural resources, including
genetic resources.
• Farmers' Rights arising from the past, present and future contributions of
farmers in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources
are recognized in order to allow farmers, their communities and countries in all
regions of the world to participate fully in the benefits derived at present and in the
future, from the improved use of plant genetic resources, through plant breeding or
other scientific methods.
• Biological diversity, including genetic diversity, shall be conserved, enhanced
and sustainably used. Patents and other IPR shall be supportive of and not run
counter to this objective.
• Access to genetic resources shall be subject to Prior Informed Consent (PIC).
Where granted, access shall be on mutually agreed terms.
• Benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources
shall be shared in a fair and equitable way upon mutually agreed terms,
multilaterally or on a bilateral basis.
• The results of research and development arising from the utilization of genetic
resources, as well as the technology using such resources, shall be shared in a
fair and equitable way on terms mutually agreed upon. Transfer of technologies
relevant to the conservation of biological diversity, and access to the sustainable
use of its components, and to technologies that make use of genetic resources
shall be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms.
• Indigenous and farming communities' knowledge, innovation and practices
related to plants and plant genetic resources shall be protected and encouraged.
Special measures shall be taken to ensure this, including mechanisms of free and
informed consent.
 The sui generis system as required by the TRIPS Agreement is not an adequate instrument to
realize all aspects of the above obligations and rights. Neither can it address all the problems
related to the sharing of benefits between users and providers of genetic resources as well as
related knowledge. Nevertheless, in the process of developing sui generis systems for the
protection of plant varieties, these principles should be taken into account and it should be
ensured that neither the overall sui generis system nor any other IPR run counter to them.
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 The sui generis system as required by the TRIPS Agreement neither aims at the sustainable
conservation and use of biodiversity, nor is its purpose to protect and promote local
knowledge systems, stressing the collective and non-proprietary nature of those systems.
Yet there are other legally binding as well as non-binding instruments which were
designed to deal specifically with questions concerning plant genetic resources and so-
called traditional resource rights.  There is also a growing body of internationally accepted
principles dealing with the socioeconomic rights of local communities and especially of
indigenous peoples.  These rights and principles often cover the natural resources forming
the basis of local communities' and indigenous peoples' livelihood, in most cases including
biological resources, implicitly or explicitly.  They also cover certain types of uses of natural
resources, i.e. acts that might be affected by IPR legislation dealing with plant varieties.  The
principles and obligations enshrined in these texts certainly merit attention in the
development of a sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties.
 Thus, the purpose of this chapter is briefly to outline these internationally accepted
principles and to explore what demands they pose to IPR in the field of plant genetic
resources and to the sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties, in particular.  It
should be noted, however, that the sui generis system as required by the TRIPS Agreement is
only one and not necessarily the most adequate instrument to realize all those principles.
Nevertheless, in the process of developing sui generis systems for the protection of plant
varieties, member states may consider introducing provisions implementing, for example,
Farmers' Rights in order to balance the privilege being granted to plant breeders by the sui
generis right.  In the development of a sui generis system it should also be ensured that
neither the overall system itself nor any other IPR run counter to the principles and rights
enshrined in those agreements and international treaties dealing specifically with the use
and conservation of biodiversity.
 
 
 3.1  The principle of national sovereignty over genetic resources
 
 3.1.1  The basic international instruments
 In 1983 the first document of global relevance dealing with the exploration, preservation,
evaluation and the making available of plant genetic resources was adopted by the 22nd
session of the FAO Conference.  At the time of its adoption, the (legally non-binding)
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR) which, at the latest count in
1995, was adhered to by 110 countries, was primarily based on the "universally accepted
principle that plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should
be available without restriction".
 However, the claimed principle of free exchange incurred the displeasure of some
countries providing breeders' rights for plant varieties, since the Undertaking not only
applied to plant genetic resources sensu strictu but also to "special genetic stocks" as well as
"current breeders' lines".  Countries providing Plant Breeders' Rights (PBR) felt there was a
danger that such rights might be in conflict with the principle of free exchange as
enshrined in the Undertaking.  In an attempt to reconcile PBR with the principle of free
exchange, FAO therefore qualified the free-exchange principle in 1989 by adopting an
"agreed interpretation" of the Undertaking (Resolution 4/89).  The agreed interpretation
states on the one hand that PBR as provided for under UPOV are "not incompatible" with
the International Undertaking".  On the other hand it emphasizes that plant genetic
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resources should nevertheless be freely available as a "heritage of mankind", while at the
same time making sure that "free access" does not mean free of charge.
 The approval of Plant Breeders' Rights was balanced with the simultaneous recognition
of the Farmers' Rights concept (Resolution 5/89) which can partly be understood as a
direct response to the PBR regimes.
 Finally, in 1991, the Undertaking's free-exchange principle was further qualified by an
FAO resolution explicitly endorsing that nations have sovereign rights over their plant
genetic resources.  Additionally, Resolution 3/91 states that breeders' lines and farmers'
breeding material should only be available at the discretion of their developers during the
period of development.  The introduction of the sovereignty principle was accompanied by
a decision in favour of setting up the International Fund for Plant Genetic Resources,
through which the concept of Farmers' Rights should be implemented.  Based on strictly
voluntary contributions, this fund has up to now failed to reach its objectives.
 The difficulties in achieving any substantial and operational concept of Farmers' Rights
in FAO may have been one reason why, in 1992, plant genetic resources, among others,
were made the subject of another agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
The CBD, which has been ratified (as at 23 April 1997) by 168 countries, is the only
instrument of international law dealing with biodiversity and genetic diversity as such
(Glowka et al. 1994).  While reaffirming and building upon the principle that states have
sovereign rights over their own biological resources, the Convention aims at the
conservation of biological diversity, at the sustainable use of its components, and at the fair
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic, including plant
genetic, resources.
 
 The interface between the IUPGR and the CBD
 The CBD has not replaced the IUPGR. First of all, both instruments are different in scope.
While the IUPGR covers (and is confined to) all plant genetic resources, the CBD, which in
principle covers all biological resources, does not address access to collections of genetic
resources that were acquired before its entry into force.  Secondly, the CBD is silent on the
issue of Farmers' Rights, while this is one of the important building blocks of the IUPGR.
Consequently, Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Final Act has recognized the need to seek
solutions for both issues, i.e. access to pre-existing collections and Farmers' Rights, within
the FAO Global System for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture.
 Although such solutions have not been reached yet, FAO has made some progress in
contributing to the implementation of the IUPGR and the CBD.  The International Code of
Conduct for Plant Germplasm Collecting and Transfer, adopted by the FAO Conference in
1993, offers a model framework for national legislation on plant germplasm, whether
collected in accordance with the Convention or not, which would allow countries to
exercise sovereignty over, and to benefit from, their plant genetic resources.  Furthermore, in
1994, FAO negotiated a model agreement with the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) placing the international collections of plant germplasm
maintained at the CGIAR Centres under the auspices of FAO.  The agreements, which in
the meanwhile have been concluded between FAO and all the CGIAR Centres holding
plant genetic resources, identically state that the Centres shall hold designated material in
trust for the benefit of the international community and shall not claim legal ownership
over the germplasm or apply any form of IPR to the material itself or related information.
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However, the agreements neither provide for any regulations on the sharing of benefits
arising out of the use of the germplasm, nor address the issue of Farmers' Rights.
 Moreover, as a follow-up to Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Final Act, the FAO Conference
took the decision to start negotiations on the issue of the realization of Farmers' Rights, on
the issue of access on mutually agreed terms to plant genetic resources including ex situ
collections not covered by the CBD (cf. IPGRI 1996), and on the harmonization of the
IUPGR with the CBD.  Important contributions to these questions are expected from the
ongoing negotiations in the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (CGRFA).
 
 3.1.2  The meaning of national sovereignty over plant genetic resources
 The sovereign right of a state over its territory, including its natural resources, is a well-
established principle in international law (Correa 1994b).  The CBD as well as the IUPGR
(through Resolution 3/91) are premised on the concept of the sovereign rights of states to
exploit their own resources according to their own policies.  The Convention explicitly
infers from this right the authority of states to determine and regulate access to their genetic
resources.  Although this principle of sovereignty over genetic resources had already been
stated by the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, it is to the
Convention's credit that it has enshrined this principle for the first time in a provision of a
binding international treaty.
 While the sovereign right of states over their genetic resources is no longer questioned, it
should be noted that it may be very difficult to exercise this right in practice.  Difficulties in
exercising a right do not limit the right as such; they may, however, render this right less
significant.
 
 3.1.2.1  Exclusiveness of the sovereign right
 The significance of a country's right to determine access to its genetic resources greatly
depends on whether this right is exclusive.
 The fact that genetic resources are replicable and that many genes occur in more than
one country has considerable implications for the realization of a country's sovereign right
over its genetic resources.  While in such cases one may argue that each of the two or more
countries of origin have sovereign rights separately, it is also clear that these rights do not
extend to each other's resources.  Thus, sovereign rights over genetic resources can be of an
exclusive nature only if the resources occur in not more than one country, or if all countries
of origin have agreed to exercise their rights jointly.
 
 3.1.2.2  Controllability of access to genetic resources
 A further difficulty for countries to exercise their sovereign right over genetic resources is
due to the enormous problems of controlling access to genetic resources.  There is evidence
that in the follow-up to the entry into force of the CBD, a growing number of countries have
started to regulate access to their genetic resources (Barber and La Vina 1995; Ruiz 1995;
Zakri 1995).  In fact, many developed as well as developing countries had such legislation
in place long before the CBD explicitly reaffirmed their competence to regulate access (Ajai
1995).  However, as is the case with laws in general, access laws are only as good as the
possibilities to control compliance with them.
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 Controlling compliance with access legislation is especially difficult because seeds are
small and their removal is almost impossible to control physically.  A small number of
seeds having illegally left the country may suffice to deprive that country of its actual
control over the resource.  Losing control over the resource does not of course mean that the
country is also deprived of its sovereign right.  It means, however, that the tool for
exercising this right, which is exclusive control over the resource, is no longer available.
 
 3.1.2.3  Legal limitations to the sovereign right
 Apart from the rather technical limitations mentioned above, the sovereign right over
genetic resources is also limited by legal duties.  The CBD, as well the IUPGR, clearly aim at
an exchange system for plant germplasm which should be as free as possible.  Thus, the
CBD requires contracting parties to endeavour to facilitate access by other contracting
parties and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the objectives of the Convention.
Similarly, the above-mentioned FAO Code of Conduct on Germplasm emphasizes that
access to plant genetic resources should not be unduly restricted.
 In order to ensure a smoothly working system for germplasm exchange, both the CBD
and the IUPGR require that access to genetic resources be granted on "mutually agreed
terms".  The CBD, as well as the FAO Code, require as an additional instrument the Prior
Informed Consent (PIC) of the country providing resources.  The PIC procedure is to ensure
compliance with access legislation (see IPGRI 1996).
 Finally, the sovereign right over plant genetic resources is limited by two further
important factors which are explicitly mentioned in the CBD.  Firstly, the sovereign right
must be exercised in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law.  Secondly, the right of states to exploit their own resources does not
affect their responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not




 3.2  Access to plant genetic resources on mutually agreed terms
 The sovereign right of states over their plant genetic resources implies the right to grant or
refuse access to plant genetic resources.
 The IUPGR does not use the expression 'free access' in its main text.  Instead, it specifies
the conditions under which states are required to allow access to samples of their genetic
resources and to permit their export, where the resources have been requested for the
purposes of scientific research, plant breeding or genetic resource conservation.  It has been
argued that the Undertaking clearly excludes access with the aim of reproducing the
materials for commercial purposes, such as for propagating seeds (Correa 1994b).  While
this is formally correct, the line between commercial and breeding purposes may sometimes
be difficult to draw.
 According to the Undertaking, samples are to be made available "free of charge, on the
basis of mutual exchange or on mutually agreed terms".  From this it is not clear at all –
though it seems to be a common understanding – that the Undertaking in its 1983 version
subscribes to the concept of free exchange.  Instead, one could interpret the Undertaking as
allowing three alternative ways by which plant genetic resources may be made available:
free of charge, on the basis of mutual exchange, or finally, on mutually agreed terms.  In
1983, states adhering to the IUPGR obviously focused on the first and second alternatives.
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 All three ways to make plant genetic resources available are also allowable under the
CBD which, however, only explicitly mentions the last option: Art. 15 (4) makes mutual
agreement on terms a condition for access to genetic resources.  Additionally, Art. 15 (5)
CBD offers contracting parties the option to make access to genetic resources subject to their
PIC.  As a means of ensuring compliance with bilateral or multilateral access agreements or
with a state's national legislation, the PIC procedure may be an appropriate though not the
only conceivable instrument.14
 The CBD, the IUPGR and the Code of Conduct make access to plant genetic resources
conditional on reaching mutually agreed terms, and, thus, imply negotiations between the
party granting access and another entity desiring access (Glowka et al. 1994).
 The negotiators of the CBD left it up to the Convention Parties to decide on how the
provisions on access to genetic resources and on PIC are to be implemented.  In particular,
the Convention does not include any provisions on the actual contents of possible access
agreements nor does it give any hint on how the PIC procedure should be implemented.
 
 3.2.1  Mutually agreed terms
 While the Undertaking makes access to genetic resources conditional on negotiations
between the resource providers and governments as well as 'institutions' active in the field
of plant genetic resources, the CBD only provides for negotiations between the contracting
parties granting access and other entities.  However, by setting up the necessary legislation,
contracting parties make their access conditions binding on private resource providers as
well.
 Although the Convention leaves considerable discretion to the negotiators (Glowka et al.
1994, cf. UNEP 1995), the terms to be agreed have to be consistent with the obligations and
general aims of the CBD.
 
 3.2.2  Prior Informed Consent
 The principle of prior informed consent (PIC) is inextricably connected with the
requirement of mutually agreed terms as set out above.  Depending on the terms for access
and use, PIC will be given or not.  So far the PIC procedure has only been used for
dangerous substances.  The best-known convention requiring PIC of the importing country
is the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal [28 I.L.M. 649 (1989)].  Two further non-binding instruments using the
PIC principle, the FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of
Pesticides and the UNEP London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals
in Trade, also focus on dangerous substances exclusively. While these instruments use the
PIC requirement in order to give countries the choice of whether importation of certain
dangerous substances shall be allowed, the PIC requirement as provided for by the CBD
will mainly have to serve as an instrument to control export and as a tool for negotiations
on the conditions under which access is granted and export permitted.
 
                                                                
 14  The agreement between FAO and the CGIAR Centres holding genetic resources makes the
granting of access to designated germplasm conditional on a further requirement, i.e. that any
entity receiving samples shall not claim legal ownership over the samples received and shall
further ensure that this condition is respected in transfers to third parties (cf. Barton and Siebeck
1994).
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 3.2.3  Approval and involvement of the holders of knowledge
 According to Art. 8 (j) CBD, contracting parties shall as far as possible and appropriate
promote the wider application of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices and
encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits from the utilization of such knowledge,
innovations and practices "with the approval and involvement" of their holders.  Thus, the
CBD makes access to plant genetic resources conditional not only on reaching mutually
agreed terms between the party granting access and another entity desiring access.  In
addition the CBD requires approval of and benefit-sharing with the holders of knowledge,
innovations and practices.  However, this requirement is subject to the parties' national
legislation which implies that all national legislation will take precedence (Glowka et al.
1994).
 The Convention gives no hint as to how this sort of domestic PIC procedure and benefit-
sharing should be organized.  To implement the domestic PIC procedure as part of the
international PIC procedure suggested in Art. 15 (5) CBD, one could, however, consider
making the international PIC dependent on the prior informed consent of the local
communities involved (Hendricks et al. 1994).
 
 
 3.3  Benefit-sharing
 The sustainable use, conservation of biological diversity and the equitable sharing of
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources are the aims which the CBD
pursues by recognizing the right of states to determine and regulate access to their genetic
resources and by requiring that access to genetic resources shall be subject to PIC and shall,
where granted, be on mutually agreed terms.  The principle of benefit-sharing is a generally
accepted principle of international law.  Beyond the different language of the legal
instruments and the different actors addressed by the instruments, a principle has emerged
in recent years that those who have been caring for and who provide (plant) genetic
resources should participate in the benefits arising from the use of these resources and
related knowledge.
 
 The principle of benefit-sharing with communities or individuals providing resources
is also endorsed by Agenda 21. Chapter 14 (57) calls for measures for "the fair and
equitable sharing of benefits and results of research and development in plant
breeding between the sources and users of plant genetic resources".  Chapter 15
(4g) reiterates this objective by requiring users to "ensure the opportunity for the
participation of [indigenous people and their communities, emphasizing the
particular role of women] in the economic and commercial benefits derived from the
use of such traditional methods and knowledge".  Furthermore, the principle of
benefit-sharing is reflected by the Farmers' Rights Resolution 5/89 to the IUPGR
which requires that farmers, especially those in developing countries, should
benefit from the use of the natural resources they have conserved.  According to the
FAO Code of Conduct on Germplasm, the sharing of benefits between donors and
users of plant genetic resources, and the facilitating of compensation of local
communities and farmers for their contribution to the conservation and development
of plant genetic resources, shall be promoted.  Users of genetic resources shall, in
particular, provide compensation to the local communities and farmers for the
benefits derived from the use of germplasm (Art. 14).  The compensation may, for
example, consist of technology transfer, training or support of research.
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 The rationale behind the idea of the sharing of benefits is that those conserving and
developing genetic resources through their sustainable utilization shall be compensated
and shall obtain incentives to carry on doing so (e.g. Gollin 1993; Cooper et al. 1994).
 According to Art. 15 (7) CBD contracting parties shall take legislative, administrative or
policy measures with the aim of fairly and equitably sharing the results of research and
development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic
resources with the contracting party providing such resources.
 Moreover, contracting parties shall encourage, also at national level, the equitable
sharing of benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices
(see 2.2.3).  For this purpose, it is certainly not enough simply to ensure that benefits return
to the parties providing resources.  Compensation should also flow back to the particular
people who conserve biodiversity (WRI et al. 1992; Downes 1993).
 The benefits may be shared in cash or other forms, such as monetary benefits, royalties
or access to (bio)technologies developed with the genetic resources in question (Glowka et
al. 1994; UNEP 1995).  The Convention leaves considerable discretion to the contracting
parties as to the form of multilateral or bilateral, individual or general benefit-sharing
agreements.  However, benefit-sharing agreements need to comply with the general aims of
the Convention.  In particular, any benefit-sharing regime should ensure the involvement of
the holders of the resources and related knowledge (cf. ICCBD 1994; IPGRI 1996).
 Both the CBD and the FAO Code of Conduct on Germplasm suggest building up the
scientific research capacity of those countries which provide genetic resources.  The FAO
Code proposes, as one form of compensation for the benefits derived from the use of
germplasm, various measures in training, support for research, support for programmes to
evaluate and enhance local 'landraces', and supply of scientific and technical information
obtained from the germplasm.  The Convention requires contracting parties to endeavour to
develop and carry out scientific research based on genetic resources provided by other
contracting parties with the full participation of such contracting parties, where possible
within their territory (Arts. 15 (6), 19 (1) CBD).
 
 
 3.4  Traditional Resource Rights
 The term 'Traditional Resource Rights' (TRR) has been introduced to encompass many
different types of rights relating to the traditional or customary use of resources by
indigenous people and local farming communities.  The term reflects an attempt to build
upon the concept of IPR protection without restricting it to the concept of property, while
recognizing that traditional resources – tangible and intangible – are also covered under
several other international agreements (Posey and Dutfield 1996).
 TRR as a package of rights primarily aim at the protection of the traditional or
customary use of tangible and intangible resources by indigenous people and local farming
communities.  Some of these rights have as yet barely materialized in binding regulations,
even though the necessity to strengthen them is widely recognized, not least with respect to
the possible benefits on the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources.
 It is, however, difficult to define the holders of TRR. This is why the IUPGR provides for
an international fund, by which Farmers' Rights shall be implemented.  A further problem
with TRR is that some of the common legal terms and concepts – like 'property' and 'tenure'
– cannot always be easily applied to social situations, institutions and relations existing
among indigenous peoples or traditional farming communities.  For indigenous people,
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'property' frequently has intangible, spiritual manifestations and any attempts at
individual control, privatization or creation of a commodity of these is incomprehensible or
at least highly problematic.
 
 3.4.1  Indigenous peoples' rights
 There is no internationally accepted definition of the term 'indigenous' or the term 'tribal'
which is sometimes used synonymously (CHR 1979; ILO No. 169; Axt et al. 1993; Hitchcock
1994; Greaves 1996).  Furthermore, there is a long-standing debate whether indigenous
groups are to be called 'communities', 'people', 'peoples' or 'populations'.  The term
'peoples' is associated with the right of complete self-determination, which governments
often have no intention of according to indigenous groups residing within their national
territory.  However, the terms now seem to be used interchangeably (Axt et al. 1993).
According to the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (1987)
the term 'indigenous' includes the four elements of pre-existence, non-dominance, cultural
difference and self-identification.
 
 3.4.1.1  The right to self-determination
 The basic right of indigenous peoples urged for in many international declarations is the
right to self-determination.  Many general international norms relevant to self-
determination are contained in texts which do not specifically address indigenous
people(s) but focus on human rights in general, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  These instruments of
international law contain inter alia the right to own property individually or collectively,
the right to maintain and enjoy one's own culture, the right to equal protection of the law
and minority rights (Shelton 1995).  The only international human rights treaty specifically
concerned with indigenous peoples is ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries which was adopted in 1992 and is at present
legally binding on eight parties only.
 In accordance with many other instruments and declarations, ILO Convention No. 169
calls for measures to realize the social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous and
tribal peoples with respect to their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions
and to safeguard their property, labour and culture, in accordance with their own "freely-
expressed wishes".  By aiming at protecting against arbitrary discrimination, deprivation or
other prejudicial actions, most of these rights are of a rather defensive nature, whereas the
positive rights to material and immaterial aspects of indigenous peoples' livelihood are
generally secured more vaguely.  While it is recognized unequivocally in international
environmental law that indigenous people possess knowledge and use traditional
practices that are essential for the conservation and sustainable use of the environment,
this has had little effect in the past on the rights granted to indigenous people regarding the
protection of their knowledge, their land rights or their rights to control over their natural
wealth and resources (Shelton 1995).
 
 3.4.1.2  The right to land
 However, there is a clear trend towards the establishment of such rights, as they are
embodied, for example, in the 1993 agreed Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Populations (CHR 1993).  The rights to land and territory are also addressed in the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, ILO Convention No 169 and the International
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Art. 26 of the Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Populations attributes to indigenous communities the right to their
land, including "fauna and flora and other resources which they have traditionally owned
or otherwise occupied or used".  Such a right would clearly enable indigenous communities
to regulate access to the genetic resources, including plant varieties, situated on their land
and territories.  While their property right to the land where the resources are based is still
controversial, the right of indigenous communities to participate in those decision
processes which affect them and their local livelihood systems is clearly established in
international law.
 However, even if such rights were recognized, the ability in practice to prevent others
from using the resources would be a more likely basis for an agreement to use these
resources under which a system of returns to the community could be established (ICCBD
1994).
 
 3.4.1.3  The right to indigenous intellectual and cultural property
 A trend similar to that which concerns tangible resources exists in relation to the
knowledge and culture of indigenous people.  Because of the nature of most knowledge of
indigenous and local communities – held collectively, evolved over time – existing
intellectual property regimes are largely inadequate for protecting or rewarding this
knowledge (Axt et al. 1993; Lesser 1994).  Intellectual property legislation, like patent or
copyright law, is basically designed to protect readily identifiable, differentiated
contributions to existing, general knowledge, while due to its very nature indigenous
knowledge is gradually built over decades or centuries (CHR 1992; Shelton 1995) and is
often traditional knowledge which due to its lack of novelty is, in particular, not protectable
under patent law.
 ILO Convention 169 states that governments shall "respect the special importance of the
cultures and the spiritual values of the peoples concerned, of their relationship with the
lands and territories ... and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship" (Art. 13
(1)).  In general terms, the protection of the intellectual property and traditional knowledge
of indigenous people is also recognized by Agenda 21 (Chapter 26, 4b) which explicitly
calls for action to "adopt or strengthen ... legal instruments that will protect indigenous
intellectual and cultural property".  Also, the Draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights
clearly recognizes the ownership, control and protection of cultural and intellectual
property of indigenous peoples (Art. 29).  They are accorded the "right to special measures
to control, develop and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations,
including human and other genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of properties of
fauna and flora".
 Suggestions that the "intellectual integrity" of indigenous communities be recognized
also resulted from the debate about the protection of "expressions of folklore"
(UNESCO/WIPO 1985; UNESCO 1989).  The Model Provisions for National Laws on the
Protection of Expressions of Folklore, set up jointly by UNESCO and WIPO in 1985, are
directed against any "illicit exploitation and other prejudicial actions" and aim at the
control of cultural 'folklore' expression through people still using these expressions in their
customary context.  The Model Provisions define folklore as "the totality of tradition-based
creations of a cultural community ... recognized as reflecting the expectations of a
community insofar as they reflect its cultural and social identity" (UNESCO 1989).  In
indigenous societies, plant varieties sometimes referred to as 'folk varieties' (Keystone 1990)
may well fall under that definition.  Finally, as set out above, Art. 8 (j) of CBD requires
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contracting parties to respect the achievements of indigenous and local communities,
including their knowledge, innovations and practices.
 
 3.4.1.4  The right to benefit from the use of indigenous knowledge
 The right to indigenous intellectual property requires not only that the value of such
knowledge is recognized, but also that the holders of such property shall benefit from the
use of their knowledge or material.  While the UNESCO/WIPO Model Provisions suggest
that the authorization to use folklore be made dependent on payments, Art. 8 (j) of the CBD
urges for the "equitable sharing of the benefits arising from traditional knowledge
innovation and practices".  The Draft Declaration on Human Rights requires "just and fair
compensation" where resources of indigenous communities are being affected.  Finally, Art.
15 of ILO Convention 169 states that indigenous people shall participate in the benefits
arising from any activities relating to resources pertaining to land of indigenous and tribal
peoples.
 
 3.4.1.5  Participatory rights
 Indigenous peoples' rights also include the right of indigenous or local communities to
participate in any decision relating to their resources and knowledge, particularly when
commercial acts are envisaged.  This principle is directly reflected in the CBD's Art. 8 (j)
requiring the approval and involvement of the holders of knowledge (see 2.2.3).
 Pointing in the same direction, the WIPO/UNESCO Model Law makes any expressions
of folklore with gainful intent subject to authorization by the traditional users. Art. 15 of
ILO Convention 169 urges that wherever a state "retains the rights to ... resources pertaining
to lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall
consult these peoples" to assess their interests before undertaking or permitting any
programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources.  Similarly, Principle 22 of
the Rio Declaration supports the recognition of interests of indigenous peoples and calls for
their "effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development".
 The strongest mechanism to realize the requirement of authorizing the use of resources
is the instrument of PIC as discussed above.  Usually applied at the international level, the
PIC mechanism may also be applied to acts at the national level.
 To sum up, participation in decision-making, including PIC, and the sharing of benefits
based on the use of indigenous knowledge or resources, are principles which are
increasingly recognized or at least reflected by international law as a means for the
realization of indigenous peoples' rights.
 
 3.4.2  Farmers' Rights
 There are important differences between indigenous communities who may also often be
farmers, and farming communities that are not indigenous (GRAIN 1995).  Indigenous
communities have distinctive and often unique social characteristics and there are many
situations where their interests may conflict with the interests of farming communities
belonging to a dominant culture.  However, both groups are faced with similar problems in
relation to their traditional resources.  Both tend, for example, to be marginalized, they are
often directly dependent on the functioning of local ecosystems and they may have
common demands for self-management and control over their resources (Singh Nijar 1994).
They often have very similar interests in relation to the protection of their knowledge,
innovation and practices relating to plant genetic resources.
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 Since Farmers' Rights serve the purpose of attaining the IUPGR's overall purposes, it
should be noted that any actions contrary to the goals of the Undertaking must also be
termed as incompatible with the concept of Farmers' Rights.  Implementing the Farmers'
Rights concept does not just mean implementing the International Fund on Plant Genetic
Resources.  The Farmers' Rights concept poses demands on the international resource
policy and it certainly requires that farmers in developing countries participate in the
advantages and benefits derived from plant genetic resources. Furthermore, in line with the
CBD, Farmers' Rights demand that national and international agricultural research fully
respond to the needs and demands of farming communities.  The Farmers' Rights concept
also calls for the full participation of farmers in the results of and the benefits resulting from
the use of plant genetic resources and related knowledge (Leskien and Flitner 1996).
 
 3.4.2.1  Farmers' Rights as IPR?
 As with other Traditional Resource Rights, however, it would be a misconception to
consider Farmers' Rights as a type of IPR, similar to PBR or patents.  Rather, they are a
concept which can be realized only with a package of measures to support farmers in their
ongoing contributions to plant varietal diversity.
 The fact that Farmers' Rights in the context of the IUPGR cannot be claimed by
individual farmers and are not directed to anything specific, such as plant varieties, is
represented very clearly in FAO Resolution 5/89.  This defines Farmers' Rights as "rights
arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving
and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centres of
origin/diversity.  These rights are vested in the International Community as trustee for
present and future generations of farmers in order to ensure full benefits for farmers, and
supporting the continuation of their contributions as well as the attainment of the overall
purposes of the International Undertaking".
 
 3.4.2.2  Farmers' Rights as a demand on IPR
 Most relevantly, the concept of Farmers' Rights imposes clear demands on the existing
system of IPR.  As already mentioned, in 1989, Farmers' Rights were declared "not
incompatible" with PBR "as provided for under UPOV" (see 3.1.1).
 This statement, however, obviously related to the UPOV Act of 1978 and not to the (then
non-existent) Act of 1991.
 By leaving the so-called farmers' exemption to the discretion of the member states, the
UPOV Act of 1991 directly concerns the Farmers' Rights concept.  A prohibition on planting
back saved seed would virtually take away a central input resource for the large majority of
all farmers in the world (cf. Jaffee and Srivastava 1994).  It would thus be in striking
contradiction to the concept of Farmers' Rights which was developed to balance the
preferential treatment of plant breeders.
 However, it should be noted that even countries that are party to the 1991 UPOV Act
will be allowed to retain the farmers' exemption (see below, 4.3.2.2).  Hence, the 1991 Act
does to a certain extent allow Plant Breeders Rights to be regulated in cohesion with
Farmers' Rights.  In the light of the Farmers' Rights concept, countries having PBR laws in
place may exploit this possibility by guaranteeing the farmers' exemption for all plant
varieties eligible for protection.
 While PBR as provided for by the UPOV Act of 1978 (and under certain conditions also
as provided for by the UPOV Act of 1991) are "not incompatible" with Farmers' Rights,
patents on components of plants or even entire plants do not seem to comply with the
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International Undertaking.  Patents on plant material would directly restrict practices that
are common to the large majority of all small-scale farmers in the world.  Being absolutely
exclusive, patents on plant genetic resources thus do not seem to be in line with the general
goals of the Undertaking.  This view is supported by the Agreed Interpretation adopted by
FAO in 1989.  Although at that time the granting of plant patents in some industrialized
countries was already common knowledge, the Agreed Interpretation only declares plant
breeders' rights as being "not incompatible" with the International Undertaking.  The
Agreed Interpretation does not mention patents. However, against the background that
access to protected materials would be more restricted by patents than by PBR, it can hardly




 3.5  The leading principles of the international framework on plant genetic
resources as demands on IPR
 
 3.5.1  The relationship between the CBD and TRIPS
 The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and obligations resulting from other
instruments of international law, in particular the CBD, has been and is still under debate
(cf. Straus 1993; Cameron and Makuch 1995; Downes 1995).
 While the TRIPS Agreement neither explicitly addresses the issue of plant genetic
resources nor mentions the issue of conservation of resources, the CBD states that patents
and IPR may have an influence on the implementation of the Convention. Art. 16 (5)
explicitly requires contracting parties to ensure that patents and IPR are supportive of and
do not run counter to the objectives of the Convention.  On the other hand, according to Art.
16 (2) CBD, in the case of a transfer of technology which is subject to patents and other IPR,
access to and transfer of the technology shall only be provided on terms "which recognize
and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of Intellectual Property
Rights".  However, the application of this requirement to recognize IPR shall be consistent
with the former statement, that IPR shall be supportive of and not run counter to the
objectives of the Convention.
 The real question is whether WTO member states may invoke the objectives of the
Convention in order to justify any measures which are contrary to the WTO TRIPS
Agreement.  This is a question of conflict of laws for which neither the TRIPS nor the CBD
provides any special rules. Art. 22 of the CBD only relates to pre-existing agreements and is
therefore not applicable to the TRIPS Agreement which was signed after the entry into force
of the CBD.  Although it has been argued that in a case of conflict (between two countries
being members of both treaties) the CBD would as the more specific treaty take priority over
the more general TRIPS Agreement (Cameron and Makuch 1995), it is rather doubtful that a
WTO Panel would agree.  A panel could certainly also take the view that the TRIPS
Agreement as the later of the two treaties takes priority over the CBD.
 It should be noted, however, that the TRIPS Agreement allows measures (see 1.4-1.10),
such as prevention of the abuse of IPR (Art. 8 TRIPS), the exclusion from patentability (Art.
27 (2) and (3) TRIPS), exceptions to the rights conferred (Art. 30 TRIPS), and certain uses of
inventions without authorization of the patent holder, including compulsory licensing
(Art. 31 TRIPS), which may possibly help to limit potentially detrimental effects of the
patent system on the objectives of the Convention, such as technology transfer, the
sustainable use of biodiversity or the equitable sharing of benefits (WTO 1995).
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 3.5.2  Specific demands on IPR
 Any legal measure to be taken in the field of plant genetic resources should avoid
restricting practices that are typical 'traditional' or 'customary' uses of the resources for
livelihood in the widest sense, especially if such practices are sustainable and form part of
the culture of indigenous people or marginalized farming communities.  It is important to
clearly limit the scope of IPR when it comes to all kind of acts performed by indigenous
people and farming communities as part of their traditional cultural heritage.  In this
context, the concept of tradition or cultural heritage cannot be understood solely in a
conservative, static sense but has to allow for the dynamic development of such practices as
well.  It could be argued that such an approach should include the right of farmers to freely
choose their seeds and planting material and to use freely all harvested products for further
production and, where it is common, also to sell these products as propagating material (cf.
Swaminathan 1996).
 In particular, IPR legislation (including sui generis legislation) should avoid interfering
with established or emerging principles of traditional resource rights.  One may argue, for
example, that the sui generis system and other IPR should not hinder any acts, such as the
planting-back of plant varieties, which form part of traditional agriculture.
 Another option to be considered is to include in the sui generis system elements that can
serve as a tool or 'trigger' to facilitate the sharing of benefits with the informal innovators
who created material or knowledge used in the creation of varieties to be protected under
that sui generis system.  More generally, the sui generis system could become a trigger point
for negotiations on benefit-sharing (see 1.3.2 and 1.4.3).  It should be noted, however, that
the principle of benefit-sharing certainly requires more than just being integrated into IPR
legislation, simply because not all applications of plant genetic resources end up being
protected by an IPR.  Since in many countries plant varieties and other products need to
undergo an authorization or certification procedure before they are allowed to be released,
the application for such marketing authorization could also be used as a trigger for benefit-
sharing.
 Furthermore, in order to implement indigenous people's rights one may also consider
designing a sui generis system in such a way that would facilitate the protection of
'traditional resources', i.e. 'landraces', and thus to provide for a direct reward for the
(historical and present) cultural efforts necessary for their creation.
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 4.  Possible Elements of an Intellectual Property Right




 Various elements can be included in a TRIPS-compatible sui generis system for the protection of
plant varieties:
• Firstly, the protectable subject matter must be defined. There are several ways to
define the term plant variety. Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement leaves the option to
protect additional subject matter.
• Secondly, the requirements for protection must be set up.  The 'traditional'
requirements for the protection of plant varieties – that they be novel, distinct, uniform and
stable – can be altered substantially.  But the plant grouping to be protected still has to be
distinct from other plant groupings and it must be possible to clearly identify it with
reasonable effort.  Moreover, additional requirements for protection may be set up, such
as Value for Cultivation and Use (VCU) or declaration of origin.  While the former may
allow member states to provide for incentives to fit their specific priorities in plant
breeding, the latter may, for example, be helpful in verifying whether the Prior Informed
Consent (PIC) of the providers of breeding material has been obtained.
• Thirdly, the scope of protection must be defined.  The physical elements (representing
a plant variety) which are to be covered by the right may include vegetative or
reproductive propagating material, and they may also include the harvested material. Also
in modelling the scope of the sui generis right, the legal acts will have to be defined which
shall require the authorization of the right-holder.  Member states could follow the models
provided by current patent law or by the different UPOV Acts.  They may also define a
different scope of protection subject to the general requirements as set out in Chapter 2.
This includes, for example, the option to grant the exclusive right to use a PVP seal for
material of a specified, registered variety in combination with its registered denomination.
Such a seal would not relate to the material as such.
• Fourthly, the definition of the duration of the sui generis right – which is not specified
under TRIPS – is an important factor to deal with.
• Fifthly, the interface with other IPR should be clearly regulated to avoid the problem of
overlapping claims, as they have been set out in Chapter 1.
• Finally, there is a package of elements that can be introduced to balance the privilege
conferred to the right-holder, such as community gene funds, registers to facilitate benefit-
sharing mechanisms and the institute of a public defender.  Each single element must be
carefully designed, but the main focus should be directed at balancing the different
interests in the overall package of elements establishing the sui generis system.
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 In this chapter a selection of different TRIPS-compatible options are discussed which
member states have in relation to the subject matter to be protected under a sui generis
system (4.1), the requirements for protection (4.2) and the scope of protection (4.3) of a sui
generis system.  Further decisions which need to be made by the member states concern the
duration of the sui generis right (4.4) and its interface with other IPR (4.5).  Member states




 4.1  Protectable subject matter
 The TRIPS Agreement itself does not provide any definition of the term plant variety, nor is
there any unambiguous and agreed botanical definition.
 It seems useful to make a clear distinction between a variety as the protectable subject
matter which must be defined as an immaterial concept, and the material of a variety as its
physical embodiment (UPOV 1992).  The delimitation of the physical elements representing
the legal (immaterial) concept 'variety' is of particular relevance when it comes to the
definition of the scope of protection, i.e. the question of what kind of acts in relation to what
kind of material of the variety require the authorization of the holder of a plant variety right
(see 4.3 below).
 Still, there are also quite different definitions of the immaterial concept of 'plant variety';
the extensive discussions within the framework of UPOV (UPOV 1974, 1992) make it
perfectly clear that the definitory problems cannot be settled by simply referring to the
protection requirements of Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability (DUS).
 
 4.1.1  Plant varieties
 As has been mentioned previously (see 2.1) member states have to provide under the TRIPS
Agreement for the protection of plant varieties of all botanical genera and species (Table 2).
While the UPOV Act of 1978 did not provide any definition of a plant variety other than the
protection requirements, the UPOV Act of 1991 has followed a different approach.  Lengthy
discussions during the 1991 diplomatic conference included proposals to completely drop
or replace the term, but finally led to a new UPOV definition of 'variety' as a:
 plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping,
irrespective of whether the conditions for the grant of a breeders' right are fully met, can be
• defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given
genotype or combination of genotypes,
• distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of
the said characteristics, and
• considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated
unchanged.
By this definition the UPOV Convention explicitly acknowledges the existence of plant
groupings which are less uniform than required to fullfill the uniformity requirement and
can still be called plant varieties.  This may be the case for many 'traditional' or 'local'
varieties, sometimes also referred to simply as 'germplasm' (obscuring in the latter case the
cultural effort involved in their origin).
Neither the term 'variety' itself, nor the words used to explain the term, abide by the
proposals of the International Code of Nomenclature of Cultivated Plants which proposes
the term 'cultivar', and plant 'assemblage' instead of plant 'grouping'.  Also, the expression
'botanical taxon of the lowest known rank' may raise some questions, as the term 'variety'
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(as used in this definition) is obviously not identical with the botanical varietas and thus
does not seem to refer to any scientifically agreed ranking system at all.
In contrast to the definitions in the UPOV Acts, Decision 345 of the Junta del Acuerdo de
Cartagena (JUNAC) specifically excludes non-cultivated plant groupings, i.e. wild
(sub)species or botanical varietates, in its definition of protectable subject matter.  A 'variety'
in the sense of Decision 345 is a "set of cultivated botanical individuals that are
distinguished by specific morphological, physiological, cytological and chemical
characteristics and can be perpetuated by reproduction, multiplication or propagation".
Although the TRIPS Agreement does not allow certain varieties to be excluded from the
protection under the sui generis system, it certainly allows member states to require that
plant varieties must be the result of a breeding or at least a cultivation process (see 4.2.3.5
below).
In a first attempt to define the subject matter for a sui generis right according to the TRIPS
Agreement it should be enough here to refer simply to two characteristics upon which all
the different definitions agree: firstly, plant variety inevitably means more than one plant,
i.e. a group or 'assemblage' of plants.  Secondly, plants of such a plant assemblage need to
have some degree of similarity with each other, so that they can be distinguished from other
groups of plants.
4.1.2  Coverage of more than just plant varieties?
The TRIPS Agreement does not restrict members to the definition of plant varieties as
developed by UPOV.  Neither is there anything in the Agreement to preclude members from
additionally granting protection under their sui generis system to subject matter other than
plant varieties.  As the TRIPS Agreement sets only minimum standards for protection (see
1.2.2), members would be free under their sui generis system to protect not only plant
varieties, but also for example traditional or indigenous knowledge, 'Farmers' Rights',
communal rights or TRR.
Certainly, the recognition of such rights, whether by separate legislation or by inclusion
into a sui generis law, is not legally required under the TRIPS Agreement, nor does it satisfy
the obligations of the Agreement.  However, it would seem perfectly in line with the
Agreement and, furthermore, it might be an adequate way to implement commitments
resulting from other recognized principles of the international framework on plant genetic
resources (see Chapter 3).









All plant varieties required optional required 1 required 3
Discovered or
uncultivated plants
optional 2 required required not foreseen 3
Additional subject
matter
optional not foreseen not foreseen not foreseen
1  After a five-year transition period; additional period for new members of the Union.
2  Depending on the definition of the term 'variety'.
3  Definition of 'variety' excludes uncultivated plants.
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4.2  Requirements for protection
All four versions of the UPOV Acts of 1961, 1972, 1978 and 1991 require implicitly or
explicitly that a plant variety be new, distinct, homogeneous (uniform) and stable in order
to be eligible for protection.  These requirements have been subject to criticism for many
years. It is the criterion of homogeneity (uniformity) that was and still is heavily criticized
for reinforcing trends towards genetic uniformity, thus leading to a higher degree of genetic
vulnerability in farmers' fields (Fowler and Mooney 1990; Crucible Group 1994).
4.2.1  Novelty
Even if not explicitly, the 'novelty' requirement can be found in all existing PBR laws.  A
variety commonly known and already placed on the market for more than a limited (grace)
period cannot be eligible for protection; otherwise, it could be protected over and over
again.  There are only minor differences in how novelty is defined in different laws.
Usually, the respective provisions specify the maximum period for which the variety may
have been sold (or otherwise disposed of) to others at the date of application.  UPOV
requires absolute novelty.  Propagated or harvested material of the variety must not have
been sold (or otherwise disposed of, under the 1991 UPOV Act) to others in the territory of
the state in which the application has been filed for more than one year and in the territory
of other states for more than four years (six years for trees and vines) before the date of
application.
The requirement of novelty is certainly an impediment to the protection of truly
'traditional' varieties, i.e. varieties that have already existed for a long time and are
commonly known.  Still, many of the so-called traditional varieties undergo important
changes thanks to the continued selecting and breeding efforts of rural communities, and
so they may qualify as 'new/novel' under certain circumstances.
4.2.2  The DUS requirements
The three criteria distinctness, uniformity and stability, often referred to as DUS criteria, are
closely interrelated.  Their purpose is, first of all, to define the subject matter to be protected.
Obviously, it is a necessary condition for any system of property rights for plant varieties
that it be possible to define a plant grouping with sufficient specificity to allow the
unambiguous assignment of property rights and the enforcement of those rights (Sedjo
1988).  The TRIPS Agreement, however, does not make the DUS criteria obligatory
protection requirements of a sui generis system.  It may therefore be useful to reflect upon the
DUS criteria and on possible modifications of these criteria in order to adapt them to the
specific needs and circumstances of the particular country.
4.2.2.1  Distinctness
The UPOV Act of 1978 specifies that a variety must be "clearly distinguishable in one or
more important characteristics from any other variety".  In the 1991 UPOV Act, the
specification "in one or more important characteristics" has been dropped.  It is argued that
this change was due to the fact that the epithet "important" has in practice related to the
actual distinguishing of varieties, and not to any economic or practical interest or relevance
that the characteristic serving to distinguish varieties might have (Elena Rosselló 1994).
The General Introduction to the Guidelines for the Conduct of Tests for Distinctness,
Homogeneity and Stability (UPOV Guidelines) specifies that two varieties have to be
considered distinct if the difference determined at least in one testing place is clear and
consistent.  Both qualitative and quantitative characteristics are taken into account.  The
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Test Guidelines for individual species (e.g. wheat, rice, etc.) illustrate that most of these
characteristics are external and visible (leaf shape, stem length, colour of decorticated grain,
etc.).  Thus, in the criterion of distinctness there is some inherent tendency towards what is
called 'cosmetic breeding': minor changes in character without any practical relevance
which are, however, of decisive importance in qualifying a variety for protection.
Today, the different characteristics are mainly assessed on single plants and small
groups of plants with the underlying assumption that there is only minimal variation
among these plants, i.e. that the plant grouping is uniform.  Usually, there is no assessment
of characteristics made on plant groupings (assemblages) as a whole to compare them with
other such groupings.
Some national laws show, however, that quite diverse wording is possible while still
comforming to the UPOV framework.  The Czech(oslovakian) Law on the Legal Protection of
New Varieties of Plants and Breeds of Animals (1989), for example, requires that protectable
varieties be distinguishable by "at least one major trait or property from any other variety
that is commonly known".  The wording "major trait or property" seems to allow, if not to
urge, for more than merely cosmetic changes. Similarly, the French Law on the Protection of
New Plant Varieties (1970) demands that a protectable variety be "different from similar
already known varieties by one characteristic that is important, precise and subject to little
fluctuation or by several characteristics the combination of which is such as to give it the
status of a new variety".  Whatever the practice of granting PBR in these two countries, it
seems perfectly in line with UPOV (1978) standards to require truly 'important'
characteristics, i.e. characteristics of agronomic or other practical relevance, to distinguish
varieties.
4.2.2.2  Homogeneity/uniformity
Under the UPOV Acts a variety has to be "sufficiently homogeneous" (UPOV 1978) or
"sufficiently uniform in its relevant characteristics" (UPOV 1991), subject to the variation
that may be expected from the particular features of its propagation.
To be considered homogeneous, according to the existing UPOV Guidelines, the
variation shown by a variety, depending on the breeding system of that variety, must
generally "be as limited as necessary to permit accurate description and assessment of
distinctness and to ensure stability" (UPOV 1979).  No doubt this definition implies a
certain tolerance depending on the different reproductive systems of varieties – a cross-
pollinated variety has to be judged in a different way than a vegetatively propagated one.
Whereas the maximum acceptable number of off-types is defined exactly for vegetatively
propagated varieties and self-pollinated varieties, tolerance limits in cross-pollinated
varieties are set up only "through comparison with comparable varieties already known"
(UPOV 1979).
These specific test parameters allow at least for some flexibility concerning, for example,
the number of off-types or the degree of genetic identity in a given plant grouping.  Still, the
current interpretation of the uniformity/homogeneity requirement can be justified neither
by agronomic nor by practical reasons.  It is widely acknowledged today that in many
situations, especially in risk-prone areas, it is an advantage to have a higher degree of
variability in the fields (Berg 1996).  The current interpretation does not allow for the
protection of plant groupings with a high degree of diversity as is typical of many
'landraces', thus depriving their breeders of potential benefits.
Some of the national laws set up by UPOV members contain elements of moderation
with respect to uniformity.  The Irish Plant Varieties Act (1980), for example, explicitly
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acknowledges possible changes in time:  a variety must "be sufficiently uniform or
homogeneous as to satisfy standards and criteria for the time being specified" by the
competent authority.  A wording with comparable flexibility is contained in the US Plant
Variety Protection Act (PVPA 1970/80) which requires "uniformity in the sense that any
variations are describable, predictable and commercially acceptable" (Section 41a).  All
three specifications – describable, predictable and commercially acceptable – may be
interpreted more or less strictly and thus allow for adaptation to the specific situation in a
country or region.
An interesting definition is also found in the Austrian Federal Law on the Protection of
Plant Varieties (1993).  It allows varieties to be regarded as entities and not merely as
assemblages of largely identical plants.  Thus, a variety shall be deemed to be homogeneous
"if its individuals, as a whole or with respect to a given distribution, are sufficiently
uniform in the expression of each relevant characteristic, notwithstanding a small number
of variations ...".  This definition explicitly allows for the protection of quite heterogeneous
groupings of plants as long as the groupings as a whole express certain given
characteristics in a predictable manner (R. Hron, Vienna, pers. comm.).  The requirement of
homogeneity/uniformity may then be interpreted simply to mean that a certain plant
grouping as a whole should have certain well-defined (useful) characteristics, even if only
a limited number of plants actually has these characteristics.
The requirement of homogeneity/uniformity is highly controversial and has been the
subject of severe criticism, in particular by those concerned about the erosion of agricultural
genetic diversity.  In rewarding only the breeding of uniform varieties, today's plant
breeders' rights create what mainstream economists have called "perverse incentives"
(OECD 1996a).  Alternative protection requirements which member states could introduce
in their sui generis legislation instead are, therefore, discussed below (see 4.2.3).
4.2.2.3  Stability
The definition of stability is directly linked to the requirement of homogeneity/ uniformity.
The uniformity of a plant grouping is seen to guarantee its stability.  In practice, what has
been shown to be homogeneous is usually considered to be stable as well (UPOV 1979).
Stability means continued uniformity, i.e. uniformity in time.  Like the requirement of
distinctness, stability is usually understood as the stability of single plants or a group of
identical plants and their offspring.  Just like uniformity, however, stability could
theoretically be judged on a 'population' level using, for example, economically important
traits like yield or pest resistance in a plant grouping and testing their stability through
several generations.
The Japanese Seeds and Seedlings Law (1982) does not include stability as a requirement
for protection at all, regulating this problem simply under the section "nullity":  The
registration of a variety shall be cancelled, "where it has been found that the characteristics
of the plant of the registered variety have become different from the characteristics of the
plant at the time of its registration".
The stability requirement poses the same sort of problem as the uniformity requirement
when it comes to the protection of 'landraces'.  The genetic plasticity or potential for 'genetic
drift' may be characteristic for some traditional varieties and even sought for by farmers
and local breeders (Brush 1994).  This problem can only be solved through changing or
replacing both criteria.
4.2.3  Alternative and additional protection requirements and their
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implications
The most controversial requirement for protection common to all PBR laws is that of
homogeneity/uniformity.  As set out above (4.1.1) the definition of plant varieties included
in the 1991 UPOV Act makes it perfectly clear that there are plant groupings which can be
defined by their characteristics, are distinct and more or less stable, but do not comply with
the requirement of uniformity as required by the UPOV Convention. This might be the case,
for example, for the vast majority of 'landraces', 'local' or 'traditional' varieties.  In trying to
include these kinds of plant groupings in a property rights system sui generis, it is thus the
lack of uniformity/homogeneity that poses the main problem.  As pointed out before, a
certain level of uniformity may be advantageous in agricultural production and for the
quality of final products.  However, the limits posed by many existing PBR regimes cannot
be and are not justified by practical needs (cf. Flitner 1995).  On the other hand, the
broadening of the limits of acceptable heterogeneity leads directly to broader property
claims.  In accepting more (genetic) diversity in the definition of the potentially protectable
subject matter, the IPR granted on this subject matter may turn out to be more problematic.
If, nonetheless, broader claims shall be accepted in order to make 'local' or 'traditional'
varieties protectable, the rights conferred by the sui generis IPR need to be of a rather limited
nature.  Otherwise agricultural development and progress in plant breeding would be
severely restricted.
4.2.3.1  Identifiability:  from DUS to DI
On the one hand, it is clear that the broadening of the acceptable limits of heterogeneity
within a plant grouping to be protected inevitably leads to broader property claims.  On the
other, the levels of uniformity currently required by national authorities and international
guidelines seem to be far higher than justified by the needs of agricultural production or
processing industries.
The widely applied DUS requirements may seem justified to clearly define the
protectable subject matter of any PBR system, but they create incentives for unnecessary
and sometimes dangerous uniformity and they tend to exclude any heterogeneous
groupings of plants, which is problematic with regard to the conservation and sustainable
use of agricultural genetic diversity.  However, the criteria of distinctness and
homogeneity/uniformity can be (and under specific circumstances should be) interpreted
much less strictly in technical terms than at present.  Different possible interpretations are
reflected in the wording of several national PBR laws, even if they are not applied as they
potentially could be (see 4.2.2.2).
It might be even possible to completely replace the requirements of 'uniformity' and
'stability' by the requirement of 'identifiability', hence Distinctness and Identifiability (DI)
instead of DUS.  The term 'identifiability' emphasizes the legal need to identify the
protected subject matter instead of the specific physical properties a plant variety has to
have.  A typical combination of a few characteristics may in many cases suffice for the
assignment of a right.  This term leaves considerable and explicit flexibility for
interpretation.
A lot of the technical 'fine-tuning' can and should be left up to the respective national
competent authorities.  Much of today's very narrow limits of accepted heterogeneity are
not due to the wording of the UPOV Convention or national laws but rather to the Test
Guidelines set up by UPOV and similar guidelines and related practices of national
competent authorities.
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It is very important in this context to be aware of the links to National Seed Certification
Schemes regulating the placing of seeds on the market.  The protection of farmers from
unwanted heterogeneity/diversity in their fields – one of the historical reasons for the
development of seed legislation – cannot be achieved solely through rigid regulations
excluding large parts of (traditional) agricultural diversity from the public sphere.  Special
registers and respective labelling requirements may be a much better solution than
certification schemes which simply ban everything from the market that does not comply
with the DUS requirements. Switzerland, for example, has recently set up a 'second register'
for highly heterogeneous groupings of cereals ('landraces') (Blümlein 1996).
4.2.3.2  Different protection for heterogeneous and 'local' varieties
As they presently stand and are interpreted, the UPOV requirements for protection are
clearly an impediment to the protection of 'landraces' or 'local' varieties.  Still, if the
different elements mentioned above are combined, it is possible to define groupings of
plants that are quite heterogeneous with enough precision to allow assignment of a
property right to them.  In fact, some open-pollinated varieties (e.g. rye varieties) that have
been protected in Europe for decades are hardly less heterogeneous than many of today's
'landraces' in many developing countries.  These varieties were neither uniform nor stable,
but they could nevertheless be clearly identified.  Again, it may be useful to set up a special
unit within the competent authorities to judge, in a practical way, whether a certain
'landrace' shall be considered sufficiently defined to be eligible for protection.
However, the protection of such varieties certainly implies the possibility of broader
property claims than allowable under the UPOV Acts.  A property right tailored to protect
highly heterogeneous populations should not confer on its holder the same rights as
provided for by the UPOV Acts.
A sui generis system may nonetheless provide different forms of protection for
heterogeneous and less heterogeneous plant varieties.  It is conceivable to have two
separate protection and/or certification registers that confer different rights to different
levels of uniformity/stability (see 5.5).  In the United States, for instance, the Plant Patent
Act (PPA) for vegetatively propagated varieties, and the Plant Varieties Protection Act
(PVPA), for sexually reproduced varieties relate – at least historically – to different
standards of uniformity.
4.2.3.3  National novelty
As far as the requirement of novelty is concerned, member states may consider defining
commercial novelty in a way that allows for the protection of those varieties which have
been sold or otherwise disposed of to others on a (defined, restricted) local basis only
and/or over a certain period of time.  Similarly, member states are free to treat plants as
novel as long as they have not been offered for sale in the territory of that member state.
Such definition would, however, be in conflict with the requirement of absolute novelty as
required by both UPOV Acts (see 4.2.1).
4.2.3.4  Agro-economic priorities
Thought should be given as to how additional requirements could allow national
authorities to tailor a PBR system according to their own specific agricultural policy aims.
This could be achieved by adding an additional requirement that directs incentives,
provided for by the PBR system, to the needs and circumstances of a particular member
state.
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Prior to the UPOV Convention (1961) some of the few existing PBR systems (e.g. the
German Saatgutgesetz of 1953) included an additional requirement for a variety to be eligible
for protection: the requirement of 'usefulness', or 'Value for Cultivation and Use' (VCU,
"landeskultureller Wert").
No notion of utility/usefulness was included in the UPOV requirements for protection
because it was felt that the VCU requirement, which refers to national or local priorities,
would cause problems of compatibility between Union members.  The introduction of the
VCU requirement is especially critical in relation to the novelty requirement.  If a variety is
denied plant variety protection on grounds of lacking VCU in country A, but is granted
protection and finally placed on the market in country B, the plant variety will no longer be
deemed to be new in country A after a certain period of time.15  Thus, even if after some
years the plant variety turned out to fulfil the VCU requirement in country A, it would still
have to be denied protection on grounds of lacking novelty, having been on the market in
country B for more than a certain period of time.  For this reason UPOV decided not to
include the VCU requirement (UPOV 1974).
However, this problem could be solved by including a provision by which the fact that a
variety has been tested and placed on the market in another country at a time when it did
not fulfil the requirement of VCU under the first country's law, shall not be deemed relevant
to its novelty.
It should also be noted that VCU could only create this sort of problem at an
international level. The TRIPS Agreement, however, does not require any internationally
harmonized sui generis system.
The introduction of VCU as an (additional) protection requirement may thus be
considered useful in certain cases as it allows countries to provide for incentives to fit their
specific (economic/ecological) priorities in plant breeding.  For example, some of the High
Yielding Varieties (HYVs) developed in Centres of the Consultative Group on Agricultural
Research (CGIAR) or by multinational corporations have been criticized on the basis that
they were poorly adapted to specific agro-ecological situations or existing agricultural
practices in developing countries.  The VCU requirement offers an instrument to tackle this
problem.  Its concrete implementation, however, should be left to a national council in
which different interest groups are represented and which readjusts at regular intervals the
VCU requirement to agricultural development, and agro-economic, political and cultural
aims.  The VCU requirement should be implemented on a sector-specific and species-
specific basis.  While it might be advisable to stick closely to the common criteria in the field
of, for example, cut flowers, other sectors or species (e.g. staple food crops, minor crops)
may require a VCU requirement implementing specific need-oriented and 'adapted' criteria.
A sui generis system which requires compliance with certain quality standards of
cultivation and use may be linked quite smoothly with a liberal seed registration scheme.
Instead of providing for very general incentives and strictly regulating the placing of seeds
on the market – as is presently done in most European countries – member states may find
it preferable to allow for the marketing of a very wide array of varieties but to grant the sui
generis privilege in respect to only those varieties that fit their agricultural policy, which
may for instance include encouraging the conservation and sustainable use of genetic
diversity.
                                                                
15  UPOV 1991 Act: Six years for trees and vines, four years for all other varieties (Art. 6).
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4.2.3.5  Breeding activity
As already mentioned, JUNAC Decision 345 specifically excludes non-cultivated plant
groupings, i.e. wild (sub)species or botanical varietates, in its definition of protectable
subject matter.  Only "sets of cultivated botanical individuals" are protectable under
Decision 345.  In contrast to this, the UPOV Acts do not require the cultivation of a plant
variety, nor do they require any breeding activity to be carried out on a plant variety.
Whether truly wild plant groupings, which have neither been bred nor cultivated,
should be eligible for protection under a sui generis system does not only depend on the
scope of protection of such a system.  It may also depend on a country's general policy in
relation to access to genetic resources.  If this policy aims at the free utilization of naturally
occurring plants, it seems that such plants should rather be excluded from any exclusive
rights imposing restrictions on their use.  If, however, the knowledge and skills necessary to
find and identify such wild (or semi-wild) plant groupings or 'varieties' are also to be
rewarded by the sui generis right, it may be recommendable also to grant protection for such
groupings/varieties or even all botanical varietates (Shiva 1996).
4.2.3.6  Declaration of origin/PIC
Apart from creating a direct reward system for farmers and indigenous communities by
making 'landraces' eligible for protection under a sui generis system, members may require
the applicants for a patent and/or a sui generis right to identify the provider of the genetic
material from which a patent or a sui generis right has been derived.  For this purpose,
members may add as a further protection requirement the 'declaration of geographical
origin' of the genetic material constituting the raw material of the new variety.
Several authors (e.g. Gollin 1993) have proposed that the sharing of benefits between
users and providers of germplasm be facilitated by making it an obligation to specify the
geographical origin of used materials in any application for IPR.  However, as pointed out
earlier, an equitable sharing of benefits can certainly not be achieved by using IPR as the
only trigger point for negotiations on benefit-sharing (see 3.5.2).
It may nevertheless be very useful to require information about the geographical origin
of materials used in the breeding process of varieties to be protected.  Even if this
information is not itself used to conclude agreements on the sharing of benefits with the
providers of germplasm, it can still help to monitor and verify whether such agreements
exist.  It may, for instance, be helpful in verifying whether the PIC of the providers of the
material has been obtained.16
It is important, however, that any such provisions requiring information about the place
of origin of materials are workable.  A number of possible problems need to be addressed by
any conforming legislation.  The geographical origin of some of the materials used may be
either unknown or not revealed.  In many cases, material may originate from more than one
country.  Even if it seems feasible, thanks to the latest molecular techniques, to identify the
(genetic and geographical) origin in many cases, this would often be difficult, costly and
time-consuming.  These difficulties may explain why, in JUNAC Decision 345, the
provision requiring information about the geographic origin of the material was not made a
legal requirement for protection but was made a technical formality to which applications
should comply.
                                                                
16  Comparable provisions have been integrated in the rules of the filing procedure in the JUNAC
Decision 345.
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Table 3 compares the protection requirements under the TRIPS sui generis option to those
of the UPOV Acts of 1978 and 1991 and the JUNAC Decision 345.









Novelty required 1 required required required
Distinctness required required required required
Uniformity optional required required required
Stability optional required required required
Identifiability required not sufficient not sufficient not sufficient
Additional requirements optional inadmissible inadmissible not foreseen
1  No absolute novelty required; transition periods possible.
4.3  Scope of protection
The required effectiveness of a sui generis system does not depend on its requirements for or
the level of protection.  However, as an IPR, a sui generis system has to provide legally
enforceable rights either to exclude others from certain acts in relation to the described
subject matter and/or to obtain a remuneration in respect of certain uses of the described
subject matter (see 2.2).  Furthermore, the sui generis system has to provide for a right not
available under other forms of intellectual property covered by the TRIPS Agreement.
4.3.1  Protected material
Insofar as the sui generis system aims at the protection of plant varieties, the physical
elements covered by the system will have to be the material representing the variety.
Countries seem to have at least two alternatives here.  Firstly, they may choose between
granting protection in respect of acts concerning propagating material only, or in respect of
acts concerning the harvested material, as well.  Secondly, they may choose between
granting protection in respect of acts concerning reproductive or vegetative propagating
material, or in respect of both.  There are examples for all of these options (Table 4).












optional 1 required required required
Reproductive propagating
material
optional 1 required required not foreseen
Harvested material optional optional 2 required 3 not foreseen 4
Products directly obtained
from harvest
optional optional optional not foreseen
1 Either vegetative or reproductive propagating material, or both.
2 Coverage required for ornamental plants when used for commercial propagating purposes.
3 Provided that the harvested material has been obtained through the unauthorized use of
propagating material and the breeder has had no reasonable opportunity to exercise his right in
relation to the propagating material.
4 Disputed, see OTA 1989.
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4.3.1.1  Propagating material and/or harvested material
According to the UPOV Act of 1978, reproductive and vegetative propagating material shall
be subject to the exclusive right conferred on the holder.  Member states can, however, grant
more extensive rights in respect of certain botanical genera or species, including the
possibility to extend the right to the marketed product.
The UPOV 1991 Act defines material as propagating material of any kind, harvested
material, including entire plants and parts of plants, and any product made directly from
the harvested material.  However, acts in respect of harvested material will require the
right-holder's authorization only in cases where the harvest has been obtained through the
unauthorized use of protected material and the breeder has had no opportunity to exercise
her/his right in relation to that material.  Whether acts in relation to products made directly
from such harvested material will require the holder's authorization depends on the
decision of each contracting party.  The EU Regulation on Community Plant Variety Rights
No 94/2100, as well as the US PVPA Amendments of 1994, provide for such an extension
of the plant variety right.
JUNAC Decision 345 defines material in accordance with the UPOV Act of 1991 as
"reproductive or vegetative multiplication material in any form; harvested material,
including whole plants and parts of plants; any product made directly from harvested
material".  Whether the scope of covered material should be rather broad or narrow is
dependent on the question of which acts relative to this material shall require the
authorization of the holder of the right.
4.3.1.2  Reproductive and/or vegetative propagating material
While the UPOV Convention as well as the laws modelled after it, including the JUNAC
Decision 345 and the US Plant Variety Protection Act, cover acts both related to vegetative
and to reproductive propagating material, the US Plant Patent Act adopted in 1930 allows
for the protection of asexually propagated varieties other than tuber-propagated plants
only and, thus, exclusively covers acts in respect of vegetative propagating material.  The
PPA was the only form of protection available for plant varieties in the United States until
1970 when the UPOV-style Plant Varieties Protection Act was adopted.  Given the fact that
only a limited number of plant varieties are propagated vegetatively (irrespective of the
technical feasibility), the scope of protection of a sui generis would be severely limited if only
acts in respect of vegetative material have to be authorized by the holder of the right (RAFI
1995).
4.3.2  Acts requiring the holder's prior authorization
As set out above, the sui generis system has to accord a right either to exclude others from
certain acts in relation to the protected variety and/or to obtain a remuneration in respect of
certain uses of the variety.  Furthermore, the sui generis system has to provide for a right not
available under other forms of intellectual property foreseen in the TRIPS Agreement.
Therefore, the protection of the name of a plant variety would barely fulfil the minimum
standard of a sui generis system, since such a right would already be available under the
TRIPS section on trademarks (Arts. 15-21).  The same applies mutatis mutandis to the use of
trade secrets, which may be relevant, for example for materials or technologies involved in
the breeding process.
The scope of protection of a sui generis system may be as broad as that under patent law;
in which case, however, member states may also provide for the protection of plant varieties
by not excluding plants from patentability.  On the other hand the sui generis system could
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only provide for an exclusive right to market material of a variety under some form of PVP
seal exclusively available for plant varieties complying with certain requirements.  Between
these different options, member states have a range of possibilities in determining the acts
in respect of material of a protected plant variety which require the right-holder's
authorization.
Member states may also consider modelling the scope of protection of their sui generis
system on the UPOV Acts.  Like other conventions in the field of IPR, the UPOV Convention
defines the scope of the right which member states have to grant by establishing certain acts
which shall require the authorization of the right-holder.  At the same time the UPOV
Convention also defines specific acts which member states must or may exempt from the
acts requiring approval.  Such UPOV-specific exemptions are the so-called farmers'
exemption and the breeders' exemption.
The different models presented below may be combined with each other. This is but a
selection of a number of possible models.
4.3.2.1  The patent model
The rights conferred by a patent on the holder have been described earlier (see 1.8 and 1.9).
According to the TRIPS Agreement, a patent shall confer on its owner rights which are, in
principle, of absolute exclusiveness.
While it is clear that any sui generis system conferring patent-like rights to the holders of
rights would be compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, it is also clear that such a broad
scope of protection would have severe consequences for plant breeders, as well as for the
application of modern biotechnologies.  Given the fact that the overwhelming majority of
developing countries lag behind the developments in modern biotechnology and that, so
far, many of them do not have the infrastructure necessary for attracting foreign investors
active in this field of technology, not many developing countries are likely to benefit from a
sui generis system for plant varieties conferring patent-like rights. It should also be noted
that the use of propagating material which consists of or includes patented subject matter
may be held to require the patentee's authorization.  Patent law does not provide for any
farmers' exemption, nor does it foresee a breeders' exemption. Members could, however,
incorporate such exemptions into their patent laws.
4.3.2.2  The UPOV Act 1991 model
The scope of the right foreseen by the UPOV Act of 1991 goes far beyond that required by
the UPOV 1978 Act.  In fact, the 1991 revision has brought the Convention more into line
with patent law.  The 1991 Act requires the authorization of the right-holder for production
or reproduction, conditioning for the purpose of propagation, offering for sale, selling or
other marketing, exporting or importing, and stocking for any of these purposes.
These acts require the authorization of the breeder in respect of propagating material
and of harvested material (including entire plants and parts of plants), provided that the
harvested material has been obtained through the unauthorized use of propagating
material and that the breeder has had no reasonable opportunity to exercise his right in
relation to the propagating material.  Finally, authorization of the right-holder is also
required for the use, for any of the above purposes, of material of varieties (i) whose
production requires the repeated use of the protected material, (ii) which have been
essentially derived from a protected variety, or (iii) which are not clearly distinguishable
from a protected variety. While following for the most part the UPOV Act of 1991, JUNAC
Decision 345 leaves it up to the member states of the Andean Pact to decide whether
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protection should extend to varieties essentially derived from protected varieties.  By its
Decree No. 533, Colombia has taken a decision in favour of such an extension.
In line with patent law, the UPOV Act of 1991 exempts from the breeders' right acts done
for experimental purposes as well as acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes.
In contrast to patent law, however, neither is the holder's authorization required for acts for
the purpose of breeding another variety nor the commercialization of that other variety,
unless the other variety is essentially derived from the protected variety (breeders'
exemption).  Furthermore, member states may also "within reasonable limits and subject to
the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder" allow farmers to propagate on
their farm seed saved and retained on their farm.  Whether, under Art. 17 (2) of the UPOV
Convention, farmers planting back saved seed have to remunerate the right-holders, is the
subject of some controversy.  While EU Regulation No. 2100/94 requires farmers, except
small farmers, to pay an equitable remuneration to the holder which shall be sensibly lower
than the amount charged for the licensed propagating material, no comparable provisions
may be found in the US Plant Varieties Protection Act of 1994.
While any sui generis system which is modelled (as to the scope of the right) on the
UPOV Act of 1991 would, as to the level of protection, comply with the TRIPS Agreement, it
should be noted that the farmers' exemption as permitted by the 1991 Act does not allow
farmers to exchange saved seed with other farmers for propagating purposes. Farmers may
only propagate "on their own holdings" the product of the harvest which they have
obtained by planting the protected variety "on their own holdings".  Given the fact that
many farmers in developing and also in industrialized countries exchange seed for
propagating purposes on a regular basis, and that this practice of seed exchange facilitates
crop rotation as well as variety rotation, the farmers' exemption as permitted under the
UPOV Act of 1991 does not meet the needs of many countries.  It may also be questioned
whether this provision on seed exchange is completely in line with the CBD's explicit aim
to "protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with
traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use
requirements" (Art. 10 (c) CBD), and to promote their "wider application" (Art. 8 (j) CBD)).
The concept of 'essentially derived' varieties
The concept of 'essential derivation' of plant varieties aims at the prevention of so-called
cosmetic plant breeding, i.e. the 'take-over' of varieties with irrelevant changes.  It is
important to note that the concept as foreseen by the UPOV Act of 1991 is not based on the
idea that those who have been conserving genetic resources over the past centuries should
also benefit from the utilization of these resources in modern plant breeding. Under UPOV
1991, only those plant varieties that have been derived from a protected variety will be
considered as being essentially derived from the original variety. The fact that a variety has
been (partially) derived from genetic resources falling under the sovereign right or
ownership of a state is not an issue under the UPOV Act of 1991.
Today, there are still many problems in applying the principle of dependency in plant
breeding as laid down in the UPOV Act of 1991.  'Acceptable' genetic distances vary
strongly between species, so they will have to be determined for each species separately. In
some species most commercial varieties are so closely related that it is difficult not to define
them as 'essentially derived' even with recent molecular techniques.  Furthermore, it seems
unclear how to treat two very similar varieties, one of which was bred while the original
variety was still protected and the other after the protection for the original variety had run
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out.  The former would no doubt be essentially derived, while the latter apparently would
be independent.
It is conceivable that the principle of essential derivation could be used to create returns
for varieties that are available in the public domain when they are used as original varieties
for further plant breeding.  The use of such varieties, no matter whether they were publicly
bred or stem from collections, could be made subject to authorization and/or payments in
cases where the resulting variety is 'essentially derived' (H. Ghijsen, pers. comm.).  Again,
the more variability that is found in the original variety, the less likely it is that derived
varieties could be termed 'essentially derived'.  And, as set out above, if the principle of
essential derivation is applied to encompass cases of comparably large genetic distance, it
seems most likely that the availability of plant breeding material would be severely
hampered.
4.3.2.3  The UPOV Act 1978 model
Under the 1978 UPOV Act, member states have to grant rights with the effect that the right-
holder's authorization shall be required for the production for purposes of commercial
marketing, the offering for sale and the marketing of propagating material. Moreover, the
repeated use of the new plant variety for the commercial production of another variety, and
the commercial use of ornamental plants or parts thereof as propagating material in the
production of ornamental plants and cut flowers, shall require the right-holder's
authorization.
By focusing on the commercial marketing of propagating material, the UPOV Act
implicitly allows the production of propagating material of a protected variety for non-
commercial purposes.  However, the scope of this so-called farmers' exemption or farmers'
privilege is far from clear.  While it is interpreted by some UPOV member states as only
allowing farmers to plant back seeds and to exchange limited amounts of them 'over the
fence' on a strictly non-commercial basis, other member states, especially the United States,
interpreted the farmers' exemption as allowing farmers not only to re-plant seeds but also to
sell limited quantities of them for reproductive purposes ('brown bagging').  As recently as
January 1995, the US Supreme Court held in Asgrow Seed Co. vs. Winterboer et al. that under
the farmers' privilege foreseen in the PVPA, a farmer may sell for reproductive purposes
only such seed as he has saved for the purpose of replanting his own acreage (Rappert
1995).
The UPOV Act of 1978 also provides for an explicit breeders' exemption, according to
which the use of a protected variety as an initial source of variation for the purpose of
creating other varieties, and the marketing of such varieties (unless the repeated use of the
protected variety is necessary for the commercial production of another variety), are
allowable without the right-holder's authorization.
It is obvious that the protection as required by the UPOV Act of 1978 is considerably
weaker than that foreseen in patent law and the UPOV Act of 1991.  The 1978 Act does not
restrict the use of protected plant varieties for breeding purposes; the farmers' exemption
leaves considerable flexibility, as 'brown bagging' in the United States clearly shows.
However, it is also clear that the farmers' exemption as provided for in the UPOV Act of
1978 cannot be interpreted as allowing the selling and marketing of unlimited amounts of
saved seed for propagating purposes.  Thus, the implementation of the UPOV Act of 1978
will always require national legislators to draw a dividing line between allowable
marketing acts and those that require the right-holder's authorization.
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4.3.2.4  The plant variety protection seal model
The concept of granting a right to use for marketing purposes a specific seal or certificate for
seeds of a specified variety goes back to the historical roots of plant variety protection laws
and seed certification schemes.  The holder of a PVP seal has the exclusive right to use this
seal for material of a specified, registered variety in combination with its registered
denomination.  A PVP seal would definitely confer more rights than a breeder could receive
by registering the name of a variety as a trademark.  It would give holders the exclusive
right to use the PVP seal certifying that the variety complies with the requirements as laid
down in the national sui generis legislation when selling, offering, exposing or exchanging
seeds of the variety.
In contrast to the acts requiring the right-holder's authorization under the UPOV Acts of
1978 and 1991 and under patent law, the right to the use of the PVP seal would not relate to
the material of the variety as such.  Thus, the material of a protected variety would remain
absolutely free.  Only the use of the PVP seal in combination with the registered
denomination and the material of the variety would be the exclusive right of the holder and
those who have obtained that holder's authorization.
The advantages of such a PVP seal are obvious:  farmers could continue to expose and
sell saved seed; they could also use the plant variety's denomination insofar as it is not in
some way restricted by a trademark.  Yet the exclusive right to use the PVP seal for a
specific, registered variety would still give right-holders a substantial competitive
advantage, especially if the protection requirements that plant varieties have to fulfil are
adapted to the needs and expectations of farmers.
Since the PVP seal would not affect the use of the material of the protected varieties as
such, any exceptions to the right to use the PVP seal would seem to be unnecessary. In
addition, the duration of such a right could be substantially longer than foreseen in the
UPOV Acts or for patents in the TRIPS Agreement, thus corresponding better to the time
horizon of informal breeders and indigenous innovations in general (cf. Tewolde 1996).
Table 5 compares the effect of protection under the TRIPS sui generis option with those of
the UPOV Acts of 1978 and 1991 and the JUNAC Decision 345.










Production and reproduction optional required required required
Offering for sale, selling 1 optional required required required
Exporting and importing 1 optional optional required required
Conditioning stocking 1 optional optional required required
Possible additional acts optional optional optional optional
Breeder's exemption optional required restricted 2 restricted 3
Farmer's exemption optional required restricted required
1 For one of the above purposes.
2 Not foreseen for essentially derived varieties, see text.
3 Not foreseen for essentially derived varieties where their commercialization requires the
authorization of the breeder of the original variety.
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4.4  Duration
The TRIPS agreement does not specify the duration of rights under a sui generis system.
The duration of such rights should certainly be related to their scope.  A strong and
exclusive right should not have the same duration as a weaker right with many exceptions.
If, for example, the sui generis right does not protect the material of a variety as such, as is
the case with the PVP seal, a limitation of the duration of the right does not seem to be
necessary.  In this case, a long period of protection may in fact well correspond with the
time frame of informal breeding, if the protection of 'landraces' is intended (cf. Muzio 1996).
If, however, the sui generis right restricts the free use of the material of plant varieties it
should be granted for a fixed period only.  While the UPOV Act of 1978 provides a
minimum period of protection of 15 years (18 years for certain other plants, such as vines
and fruit trees), the 1991 UPOV Act provides a minimum period of 20 years (for trees and
vines, 25 years).
4.5  Interface with other IPR
Whatever form of a sui generis system member states choose to establish, the interface of this
system with other Intellectual Property Rights is of the utmost importance.
The UPOV Act of 1978 leaves each state party to the Act free to grant protection to new
varieties of plants by means of a 'special title of protection' – that is, a title specially created
for plant varieties – or a patent.  However, member states whose national laws admit
protection under both these forms may provide only one of them for one and the same
botanical genus or species.  This ban on double protection was not included in the 1991
Act.
The rationale behind the ban on double protection is that problems may arise wherever
two forms of protection with different scopes overlap.  If some varieties of one and the same
species are patented, while others are protected by UPOV-type PBR, the situation would be
quite confusing for breeders, since the latter varieties could be used freely for breeding
purposes while the use of the former varieties would infringe the patent.  Farmers would
also have to face the same insecurity if under the sui generis system the planting back of
saved seed was allowable, while under the patent it was forbidden.
The need to avoid such overlaps and contradictions of different forms of protection is
also demonstrated by the following example.  If a patented gene is inserted into a plant
which is protected under a UPOV type breeders' right, the question arises whether the plant
may be used freely under the breeders' exemption as an initial source for breeding a new
variety, or whether such use would infringe the patent on the inserted gene.  The answer to
this question is actually far from clear.  While some argue that the plant should be freely
utilizable for breeding purposes, others argue that any use of the plant would also make
use of the patented gene and thus require the patent holder's authorization. Between these
two positions, one may also argue that the use of the plant is allowable without the patent-
holder's authorization, as long as the new variety does not contain the gene, or, if it
contains the gene, does not express it.  Whatever solution is chosen, it is obvious that the
overlap of patents and weaker forms of protection tends to afford privilege to the patent-
holder and complicates the legal situation of the holder of the weaker right considerably.
Member states establishing a sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties
should therefore consider carefully the interface between the sui generis rights and other
forms of protection.  While under the TRIPS Agreement plant genes may be excluded from
patentability, this may not be the case with genes isolated from microorganisms, as
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members are not allowed to exclude microorganisms from patentability.  Because it is
currently very common to transfer genes which have been isolated from microorganisms to
plants, the interface between the sui generis right and patents definitely has to be addressed.
To this end, it might not be enough just to stipulate that plants are unpatentable, but also
that the scope of protection of a gene patent does not extend to plants into which this gene
has been inserted. It should be ensured that the scope of patents claiming genetic material
does not extend to subject matter which is excluded from patentability (see 1.8).
4.6  Balancing plant breeders' rights
In order to balance the privilege being granted to plant breeders by whatever form of IPR,
other provisions may be introduced in the sui generis or other IPR legislation or separate
laws, which implement TRR, for example.
Access regimes with their much broader coverage (or case-by-case material transfer
agreements) may contain provisions that reserve rights to the providers of germplasm and
related knowledge.  As an example, the Guatemalan Acuerdo Ministerial 177 of September
1995 requires that varieties containing any genetic material collected in Guatemala be
available for local use in Guatemala without any restrictions.  This obligation has to be
passed on by collectors to any third parties requesting the material. Furthermore, member
states may consider to set up community gene funds, registers or provide for public
defenders.
4.6.1  Community gene funds
The establishment of community gene funds which could be financed either by fees or by a
royalty of some percent of the gross value of seeds sold may be used for the benefit of the
conservers and donors of 'landraces', directly if the origin of the variety can be clearly
traced back, or indirectly, through a fund administered jointly by representatives of local
farming communities and indigenous peoples.  Where the origin of the useful genetic
material cannot be clearly identified, the royalties credited to the gene fund may be used to
strengthen the in situ conservation activities of local communities in areas threatened with
genetic erosion (Swaminathan 1995).
Such solutions may be particularly well-suited where there is a large seed market
and/or important plant breeding activities in the country (e.g. India).  Elsewhere it may be
difficult to generate funds large enough to have any nation-wide impact at community
level.
It has also been proposed that the assistance received by a country under international
arrangements such as the FAO International Fund could accrue to such community gene
funds (Swaminathan 1996).
It can be added that neither the levying of a tax on seed sales nor international measures
to support local communities need to be related to a sui generis right.
4.6.2  Registers
An additional element that could facilitate the sharing of benefits with indigenous and
farming communities is the establishment of registers (RAFI 1994; Singh Nijar 1995;
Swaminathan 1995; Tewolde 1996).
There are several mutually supportive options, ranging from national registers for local
communities and registers of folklore or informal innovation to an international database to
trace germplasm.  Such registers or databases may inter alia help to identify contributors to
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pedigrees of plant varieties or other innovations.  They may also be helpful in avoiding
what has been called "intellectual piracy" from indigenous or farming communities, in
securing that methods and materials in customary use cannot be declared as novel (Shiva
1996).
4.6.3  Public defender
Finally, an (internationally recognized) office for a 'public defender' to intervene in unequal
relationships between communities and governments or between states and multinational
corporations may be helpful in many of the proposed models (Crucible Group 1994; Posey
and Dutfield 1996).  Even strong legal positions can be difficult to defend effectively in
cases where one lacks financial means, the procedures are time-consuming and legal
expertise is out of reach.
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5.  Shaping the Sui Generis System
Summary
In shaping the sui generis system some general aspects merit specific attention.
Firstly, since some of the elements discussed in the previous chapter exclude each
other while others do not, it is necessary to match the different elements of a sui generis
system with each other.
A second important question is whether a country aims at UPOV membership or not.
Several of the elements proposed in Chapter 4 are not compatible with the UPOV Acts of
1978 or 1991.  While UPOV membership may have advantages like the right of priority or
technical and administrative cooperation, the advantage of national treatment among
UPOV members may have become irrelevant after the entry into force of the TRIPS
Agreement.
The third point to ponder is the need to create incentives for private investment in plant
breeding.  If a country has the necessary infrastructure and capacities, a strong legal
protection of plant varities may attract additional investment; if not so, the attractivity of
strong exclusive rights may be much lower.
Finally, while IPR are certainly not an effective instrument to conserve biological
diversity or promote its sustainable use, the potential impact of the different elements, in
particular the protection requirements, should be borne in mind when designing a new
system.  Furthermore, the sui generis system might be helpful in facilitating benefit-sharing
agreements or verifying the compliance with provision in a country's access legislation.
One example for the countless possible combinations of the different elements as set
out in Chapter 4 concludes the study.  It represents a two-level approach corresponding to
the strong dichotomy in the agricultural economy of many countries.
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5.1  Coherency
As has been shown in the previous chapter, there is a variety of elements that can be
included in a sui generis system for plant varieties.  Most of these elements are, however,
extremely interdependent, which means that a decision on a sui generis right will have to be
a package one, rather than several isolated decisions on single elements.
Many of the elements discussed above do not exclude each other but are mutually
supportive; others do exclude each other.  In order to achieve a coherent and smoothly
working sui generis system it will be necessary to match the different elements with each
other.
A basic rationale, reflected in all intellectual property legislation, should also apply to
the sui generis right as required by the TRIPS Agreement:  the more extensive the right
conferred on the holder, the stricter the requirements for obtaining the right should be. This
should be taken into account by all member states, regardless of which option they go for
under the TRIPS Agreement.
A further principle of IPR which should be taken into account is keeping a proper
balance between the sometimes diverging interests of the individual right-holders on the
one hand and society as a whole on the other.  This requires a careful examination of each
single element and the consequences of its inclusion into the proposed system of protection.
However, the fact that for example a certain protection requirement is considered to have
undesirable side effects does not necessarily mean that this element has to be eliminated
outright.  Instead, it may be possible to counterbalance the negative side effects by
modifying the scope or the duration of the sui generis right, or by adding other supporting
measures.
5.2  UPOV compatibility
The design of a sui generis system will inevitably depend on whether a country wishes to
join UPOV.  It should be noted that as long as the UPOV Act of 1991 has not entered into
force, developing countries may accede to the Act of 1978.  From a legal perspective, the
main advantage of being a UPOV member seems to be that under both UPOV Acts member
states have to afford the same treatment as their laws provide for their own nationals only
to the nationals and residents of the other UPOV member states.  Thus, breeders may benefit
from their country's UPOV membership if they intend to apply for protection in other UPOV
member states.  Under the UPOV Act of 1978, member states may even limit the right to
apply for protection of a variety to nationals or residents of those other member states
which also apply the Act to the genus or species to which the variety belongs (reciprocity
rule).
However, the advantage of national treatment among UPOV members might have
become irrelevant after the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement.  If it is correct that the
TRIPS principle of national treatment is applicable to all IPR covered by the Agreement,
including the sui generis system (see Chapter 1.3), this would imply that the UPOV member
states already have to accord the nationals of other WTO members treatment no less
favourable than that which they accord to their own nationals with regard to the protection
of plant varieties.  Thus, from the perspective of national treatment, UPOV membership
would seem less attractive than before the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement.
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5.3  Sui generis system as an incentive
There seems to be no reliable method of assessing the effects of the legal protection of plant
varieties on private investment in plant breeding.  The results from studies in the United
States are contradictory, to say the least (Butler and Marion 1985; Kloppenburg 1988; RAFI
1994).  A recent study on several Latin American countries showed that under conditions
of shrinking public sector investment, the introduction of PBR "seems to have prevented
reduction in R&D expenditure" rather than having stimulated additional private
investment in domestic plant breeding (Jaffé and van Wijk 1995).  It seems that if a country
has the necessary infrastructure and scientific capacities, the legal protection of plant
varieties can attract private investments in plant breeding to a certain extent.  For member
states that mainly rely on public breeding and wish to continue to do so, the legal
protection of plant varieties seems to be less interesting.  They may consider granting
TRIPS-compatible protection for plant varieties through 'less exclusive' forms of protection,
such as the PVP seal.
5.4  Conservation of and access to genetic resources
It is often argued that the value being attributed to plant genetic resources by making plant
varieties eligible for intellectual property protection would contribute to the conservation of
those resources.  This argument, while it seems plausible at first glance, does not take into
account that the reason for the loss of genetic diversity is not simply that these resources are
regarded as useless.  It is unrealistic to expect that the loss of genetic resources could be
prevented simply if plant breeding became more profitable. First of all, no more than a
minimal part of plant genetic resources will ever fit into commercial breeding programmes
or even end up on the market in the form of plant varieties (Swanson et al. 1994).  Secondly,
the loss of overall biodiversity through the global expansion of today's uniform varieties is
several orders of magnitude bigger than any possible positive ecological effects of a
growing private plant breeding business. Thus, the granting of IPR for products of modern
plant breeding is certainly not an effective instrument to conserve biological diversity.  In
strictly ecological terms, incentives to speed the spread of industrial-style agriculture are
rather counter-productive and should be properly balanced with other legal or economic
measures limiting their destructive effects.
While IPR are not an effective means of promoting the sustainable use of biodiversity, it
is important to bear in mind the potential impact of every element of an IPR system when
designing a new system.  Careful consideration should be given in particular to the
protection requirements and the links with seed legislation.
IPR laws, including any sui generis system, also do not offer an effective means to control
access to a country's genetic resources.  As the TRIPS Agreement stipulates 'national
treatment', WTO member states may not discriminate applicants for patents or sui generis
rights on grounds of their nationality.  Thus states which provide for the legal protection of
plant varieties will have to grant such protection notwithstanding the WTO member
nationality of the applicant and notwithstanding the place of origin of the material used for
the creation of the new plant variety.  Still, states may use specifically tailored IPR laws,
including the sui generis system, as a tool to facilitate benefit-sharing agreements or to verify
the compliance with certain provisions in their access legislation. They may also use non-
IPR legislation, including product legislation and seed certification schemes.
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5.5  An example of a sui generis system
It is outside the scope of this study to discuss the countless possible combinations of the
different elements of a sui generis right and to assess all their advantages and
disadvantages.  More importantly, the pros and cons of particular combinations cannot be
objectively defined.  The effect of a specific combination depends to a large extent on a
country's economic situation, its agricultural and industrial policy and its overall
development strategy.
Factors that may have a decisive impact include the importance of agricultural exports,
the state of the art in domestic plant breeding, the role of public research and the special
needs of small farmers as well as the situation of indigenous peoples.  Even under very
similar situations, for example a combination of small domestic market, high importance of
agricultural exports and poorly developed private plant breeding, very different
conclusions among different policy-makers might result when deciding on the elements of
a sui generis system.  Some may see the introduction of plant patents as a useful means to
attract investment for the construction of a biotechnology industry, others may focus
exclusively on the needs of small farmers, protecting their achievements and strengthening
public plant breeding efforts.
Thus, the example given in Figure 1 is but one possible way to bring the different
elements together.  By no means is it the 'one-size-fits-all' solution.  However, it is not
completely arbitrary that this example represents a two-level approach.  Many member
states, especially those which may have to protect plant varieties for the first time from the
year 2000 or 2005 onwards, are characterized by a strong dichotomy in their agricultural
economy.  A modern sector aiming at global markets, on one hand, is often contrasted by a
'traditional sector' mainly focusing on subsistence or local markets on the other.  For many
member states it is neither realistic nor desirable that either of the two very different sectors
disappears in the near future.
Consequently, a high degree of institutionalized flexibility and two different levels
concerning the requirements and the scope of protection, both connected at a procedural
level, are the main features of our example.












Class A:  highly uniform varieties
Class B:  heterogeneous varieties
UPOV 1978 model
PVP seal model
Verification of PIC 
for access control and/or 
benefit-sharing arrangements
Clear delimitation  
to other IPR such as gene patents
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BGHZ Bundesgerichtshof, Entscheidungen in Zivilsachen
BPatG Bundespatentgericht
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CGRFA Commission on Genetic Resources in Food and Agriculture
CHR Commission on Human Rights
DUS Distinctness, Uniformity, Stability
EPC European Patent Convention
EPO European Patent Office
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GRAIN Genetic Resources Action International
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GRUR Int. Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International
IARC International Agricultural Research Centre
ICCBD Intergovernmental Committee on the Convention on Biological Diversity
IIC International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law
ILM International Legal Materials
ILO International Labour Organisation
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IPR Intellectual Property Right(s)
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MTA Material Transfer Agreement
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OTA Office of Technology Assessment
PBR Plant Breeders' Rights
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PPA Plant Patent Act
PVP Plant Variety Protection
PVPA Plant Varieties Protection Act
RAFI Rural Advancement Foundation International
TRIPS Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
TRR Traditional Resource Rights
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UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Education and Science Organisation
UPOV Union pour la Protection des Obtentions Végétales
[International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants]
USPQ United States Patent Quarterly
VCU Value for Cultivation and Use
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation
WRI World Resources Institute
WTO World Trade Organisation
ZUR Zeitschrift fuer Umweltrecht
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